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TORT, SOCIAL SECURITY, AND NO-FAULT 
SCHEMES: LESSONS FROM REAL-WORLD 
EXPERIMENTS 
GERHARD WAGNER* 
In dealing with the problem of personal injury, societies have to make a 
choice between regimes of tort liability, the general social security system, 
and tailor-made no-fault compensation schemes. The arguments bearing on 
this choice are complex and difficult to justify. However, in one important 
area most industrialized countries operate a no-fault scheme already, and 
have done so for almost a century, namely workplace accidents and 
occupational diseases. In spite of the long tradition of workers’ 
compensation systems, it is unclear whether they are a good or a bad thing. 
A few decades ago and thus relatively recently, two jurisdictions—the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands—have abandoned workers’ 
compensation for a combination of employers’ liability with rather 
generous protection under the general system of social security. Now the 
time has come to review the experience of these jurisdictions and compare 
it to the performance of workers’ compensation systems that continue to 
operate in much of the rest of the industrialized world. One recent and 
important example that highlights the differences between the two 
approaches involves the way each deals with claims for compensation of 
diseases caused by asbestos. The asbestos cases also illustrate the current 
challenges faced by workers’ compensation systems: tort suits brought 
against employers alleging intention or other forms of aggravated fault and 
launched against third parties under theories of products liability. In the 
United States, workers’ compensation systems have been pushed aside by 
mass litigation, where manufacturers of equipment and raw materials are 
named as defendants. This development has no parallel in other 
jurisdictions and raises important policy issues that are ripe for a fresh 
discussion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The choice between tort law and other compensation systems such as 
social insurance and no-fault compensation schemes has been the subject of 
academic discussion for decades. While proposals for no-fault 
compensation schemes, particularly in the area of traffic accidents, were 
implemented in some jurisdictions, the thrust of this movement has faded 
away.1 Currently, there is some discussion on shifting medical malpractice 
into no-fault compensation schemes. In Scandinavian countries, first-party 
patient insurance has more-or-less replaced tort, and scholars have advised 
both European jurisdictions2 and the United States3 to follow this model. 
The discussions of no-fault compensation or insurance schemes as a 
replacement or a supplement to tort seem to circle around the same issues, 
 
 1.  The seminal publication is ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION 
FOR THE ACCIDENT VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965); see also 
DON DEWEES, DAVID DUFF & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: 
TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY 22–26 (1996) (providing an overview of the spread of no-fault motor 
accident schemes and their performance).   
 2.  See generally JOS DUTE, MICHAEL G. FAURE & HELMUT KOZIOL, NO-FAULT COMPENSATION  
IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR (2004).  
 3.  See Frank A. Sloan et al., The Road from Medical Injury to Claims Resolution: How No-Fault 
and Tort Differ, 60 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 36 (1997).  
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regardless of the subject matter involved. Invariably, the driving force 
behind no-fault plans is to economize administrative costs.4 The tort system 
consumes a large fraction of the money that goes around for itself—in the 
form of court and lawyers’ fees instead of allocating the funds to victims 
for the purpose of compensation. No-fault schemes seek to award the 
victims a larger share of the overall costs of the system. The main concern 
advanced against the move away from a tort system is deterrence; the 
incentives to take care and to adjust activity levels are weakened if the 
threat of liability is removed.5 Empirical studies are somewhat diverse but 
seem to confirm the prediction that incentives to take care suffer with the 
introduction of no-fault plans. However, where injuries to the victim’s 
health and body are at stake, i.e., damage that is impossible to replace and 
difficult to “repair,” the effect is smaller than anticipated.6 
This Article does not focus on how exactly the trade-off between 
efficient administration and efficient deterrence should be made in regard 
to specific subject-matter areas such as traffic accidents or medical 
malpractice. Rather, it focuses on the single area where no-fault has in fact 
been operating for decades in most jurisdictions: workplace accidents and 
occupational diseases. The no-fault plan that governs in this area is called 
workers’ compensation, which has replaced the liability of the employer 
that previously existed. The evaluation of these institutions in light of the 
compensation and deterrence goals raises complex issues about the 
performance of workers’ compensation systems that are already in place, 
but also about the performance of hypothetical systems of employers’ 
liability that would exist, if it weren’t for workers’ compensation schemes. 
While this Article cannot provide a definite answer to this empirical 
question, it highlights the experience of two European countries, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, which decades ago abandoned their systems 
of workers’ compensation in favor of reviving the private cause of action 
against the employer. Now the time has come to ask how this choice has 
fared in practice (Part V). In addition, the article confronts challenges to 
workers’ compensation systems that have arisen in the U.S. particularly, 
namely movements around the immunity rule of workers’ compensation, 
which rely on suits against employers, alleging aggravated fault, and, 
 
 4.  KEETON & O’CONNELL, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that the “operation of the present system 
[of liability in tort] is excessively expensive”).  
 5.  See Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1093 
(1993). 
 6.  For a recent empirical study see J. David Cummins, Mary A. Weiss & Richard D. Phillips, 
The Incentive Effects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 44 J. L. & ECON. 427 (2001); for an overview 
of past empirical studies and results, see Yu-Ping Liao & Michelle J. White, No-Fault for Motor 
Vehicles: An Economic Analysis, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 258, 262–64 (2002). 
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secondly, damages claims brought against third parties (Part VI). Before 
confronting these real-world examples it is important to understand the 
central features of the competing regimes as well as the policy issues 
underlying the choice between workers’ compensation and employers’ 
liability. In order to set the stage, Parts I and II begin with a brief 
recollection of the basic principles of workers’ compensation systems and 
of employers’ liability.  Part IV then offers an economic analysis of the 
relevant policy issues along the three familiar dimensions of efficient 
deterrence, efficient risk-bearing, and efficient administration of claims. 
The topics discussed include the choice between liability rules, the 
existence and scope of the contributory negligence defense, the option of 
entrusting the administration claims to public or private insurance agencies, 
and the choice between a judicial or amicable mechanism of dispute of 
resolution. 
I. SYSTEMS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: BASIC FEATURES 
There is no single workers’ compensation system. Instead, there are as 
many systems as there are jurisdictions running such programs. This is 
most pronounced in the United States where each state operates its own 
workers’ compensation system.7 In spite of all the resulting variation, the 
central features of workers’ compensation systems are surprisingly stable 
across jurisdictions. These features are outlined below. 
A. Compensation Regardless of Fault of Employer and Contributory Fault 
of Employee 
The primary goal of a workers’ compensation system is to compensate 
workers who have suffered job-related accidents or diseases. Thus, 
workers’ compensation systems are based on the principle of strict 
liability,where workers are entitled to compensation regardless of fault on 
the part of the employer.8 Even where due care had been taken, so that the 
injury or disease is the consequence of a contingency that could not have 
been avoided at reasonable cost, the employee-victim still recovers. The 
employer or the workers’ compensation organization against which claims 
are to be directed cannot defend itself by establishing that a fellow 
employee caused the harm. Finally, the claim even survives in cases where 
the worker inflicted the injury upon himself through behavior that would be 
 
 7.   See discussion infra Part II.B.  
 8.  MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW, Vol. 2, § 6.3, at 5–8 (1999) (regarding 
United States Law); YVONNE LAMBERT-FAIVRE & STÉPHANIE PORCHY-SIMON, DROIT DU DOMMAGE 
CORPOREL, SYSTÈMES D’INDEMNISATION, ¶355 (7th ed. 2011) (Fr.) (regarding French law); HEIN KÖTZ 
& GERHARD WAGNER, DELIKTSRECHT 229–31 (10th ed. 2010) (Ger.).  
WAGNER.FINAL.V3 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  11:58 AM 
6 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 23:1 
classified as contributory negligence in tort.9 
B. Insurance and Collectivization of Claims 
The original German model of workers’ compensation deliberately 
avoided the private insurance market and thus eschewed the option of a 
combination of strict employers’ liability and mandatory insurance.10 
Instead, new administrative institutions were created by combining features 
of a public insurance company with those of a regulatory agency charged 
with overseeing firms and ensuring workplace safety.11 Within this 
framework, the party who is strictly liable is not the employer himself but 
the newly created public insurance carrier. However, employers bear the 
full financial burden of the system and thus remain “strictly liable” for the 
costs of defending, processing, and satisfying claims for compensation of 
work-related accidents and diseases. 
While most countries in Europe and elsewhere have followed the 
German model, the United States has taken a different course that relies on 
the private insurance industry instead of public quasi-insurers.12 Only six 
states require the employer to participate in a state-run workers’ 
compensation scheme;13 the majority merely impose an obligation to insure 
against the liabilities generated by workers’ compensation.14 What the 
European systems achieve by transferring liability to public entities, these 
jurisdictions achieve through a combination of private liability insurance 
and the involvement of an administrative institution overseeing the 
program.15 The personal liability of the employer is not the original one 
that existed under the common law of torts, but a liability regime created 
by the workers’ compensation statutes themselves and reflecting the 
 
 9.  ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.11, at 48; see also PETER M. LENCSIS, WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION – A REFERENCE AND GUIDE 40 (1998); KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 229, 231.  
 10.  See generally John M. Kleeberg, From Strict Liability to Workers’ Compensation: The 
Prussian Railroad Law, The German Liability Act, and the Introduction of Bismarck’s Accident 
Insurance in Germany, 1838-1884, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 53 (2003) (describing the origins and 
historical background of workers’ compensation schemes in the German Accident Insurance Act of 
1884, inspired by then-chancellor Bismarck); see also KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 225–27. 
 11.  Compare FRANÇOIS EWALD, L’ÉTAT PROVIDENCE [THE WELFARE STATE] 229 (1986) (Fr.) 
(describing French institutions), with KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 233–34 (describing German 
institutions): see cmt. to fn. 8.  
 12.  See generally Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’ 
Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J. L. & ECON. 305 (1998) (providing a brief and 
informative overview of the development of workers’ compensation in the United States). 
 13.  The states requiring employers to participate in state-run workers’ compensation schemes are 
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming; LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 78. 
 14.  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, PRACTITIONER’S TREATISE, Vol. 2, 1098–99 (2001). 
 15.  ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.34, at 159; LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 75–82; DAN D. 
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1098 (2000).   
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general features of such systems. 
Regardless of these differences, the central feature of workers’ 
compensation remains that the claim of the worker is independent of the 
solvency or even the continuing existence of the former employer.16 In this 
sense, workers’ compensation systems imply a collectivization of claims. 
C. Scope of Protection 
Workers’ compensation systems do not compensate just any harm 
suffered by employees in the course of work. Their scope of protection 
remains limited to particular categories of harm, namely personal injury, 
disease, and death.17 Damage to property as well as pure financial losses 
continue to remain outside of the scope of protection. In principle, the same 
is true for dignitary injuries and other types of harm to nonphysical 
interests of the person. However, it has become increasingly difficult to 
draw the line between physical and nonphysical personal rights. 
D. Limited Compensation 
Tort law generally provides for full compensation. While it may be 
difficult to establish the elements of a private cause of action in tort, the 
successful claimant is entitled to comprehensive relief. The party held 
liable must “make the victim whole again,” i.e., restore the victim to the 
situation she would have been in but for the wrongful behavior. In cases of 
personal injury, the tortfeasor is liable for the costs of medical care, full 
replacement of lost wages, and any other pecuniary loss suffered as a result 
of the injury, such as the costs of devices and appliances that assist disabled 
persons in their daily lives. On top of that come damages for nonpecuniary 
loss, i.e., for the pain and suffering sustained due to the injury and the 
disabilities or disfigurements that remain after the resources of medical 
treatment have been exhausted. While it may not be possible to render the 
victim fully neutral between the hypothetical state of the world without the 
harm and the actual state of the world that includes a money payment, full 
compensation aims to get as close to this state as possible. 
Workers’ compensation systems function very differently from the 
 
 16.  LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 9 (“What is given includes something very valuable: the certainty 
that funds will be available to pay the benefits by virtue of compulsory insurance coverage (or approved 
self-insured status) for all employers.”).  
 17.  ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.23, at 85–86, § 6.24, at 99–100 (describing workers’ 
compensation coverage in the United States); DOBBS, supra note 14, at 1098 (describing workers’ 
compensation coverage in the United States); LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, ¶ 
372–79 (describing workers’ compensation coverage in France); KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 
228 (describing workers’ compensation coverage in Germany).  
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private law of torts and damages. As far as medical care is concerned, 
workers’ compensation carriers normally provide it “in kind,” by referring 
patients to medical service providers operating on their behalf and under 
their control, or by at least requiring the patient to obtain authorization 
from the carrier before turning to other physicians and hospitals.18 
Damages for lost earnings are not calculated in each individual case with 
the aim of making the victim whole, but are based on schedules or grids.19 
To the extent that benefits are not scheduled, they are calculated on the 
basis of reduced earning capacity or, depending on the jurisdiction, reduced 
physical capacity, which are both independent of the amount of income 
actually lost by the victim-applicant.20 
In many jurisdictions, the common method of benefit-assessment in 
cases of partial or full, temporary or permanent disablement is to have the 
handicap resulting from the injury or disease assessed by a medical expert 
who establishes the percentage-degree of disablement, and then to award a 
pension which reflects the degree of disablement and the level of wages 
earned before the harm.21 Depending on how the system is calibrated, 
where the degree of disablement is 100% the employee may be entitled to 
full income substitution, while in cases of partial disability the level of 
compensation will be set correspondingly, as a fraction of the income 
earned at the time of injury.22 Income benefits are commonly subject to an 
absolute cap, as well as to a relative one expressed in terms of a maximum 
 
 18.  LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, ¶ 373 (describing medical care provided 
under workers’ compensation schemes in France); ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.23, at 85–86, § 
6.27, at 120–21 (describing medical care provided under workers’ compensation schemes in the United 
States); LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 50–51 (describing medical care provided under workers’ 
compensation schemes in the United States); KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 231–32 (describing 
medical care provided under workers’ compensation schemes in Germany). 
 19.  ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, 1999, § 6.23, at 85-86, § 6.29, at 133–38 (describing 
calculations for damages for lost earnings provided under workers’ compensation schemes in the United 
States); LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, ¶ 378. (describing calculations for damages 
for lost earnings provided under workers’ compensation schemes in the France). 
 20.  ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.23, at 85–86, § 6.28, at 124–33 (describing calculations 
of benefits provided under workers’ compensation schemes in the United States); LAMBERT-FAIVRE & 
PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, ¶ 370, 378 (describing calculations of benefits provided under workers’ 
compensation schemes in France); KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 232–33 (describing calculations 
of benefits provided under workers’ compensation schemes in Germany). 
 21.  KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 232–33 (describing benefit assessments provided under 
workers’ compensation schemes in Germany; LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, ¶370, 
378 (describing calculations for damages for lost earnings provided under workers’ compensation 
schemes in France). 
 22.  ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, 1999, § 6.23, at 85–86, § 6.31, at 143–46 (describing the 
calculation of income substitution provided under workers’ compensation schemes in the United 
States); LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, ¶378–79 (describing the calculation of 
income substitution provided under workers’ compensation schemes in France). 
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fraction of pre-injury earnings. In jurisdictions where benefits are not 
subject to income tax, the typical measure of income replacement for fully 
disabled workers is two thirds of the pre-injury wages.23 Typically, 
compensation is not awarded as a lump sum but in the form of a pension 
that is paid in addition to wages still being earned. From time to time, the 
level of the pension will be adjusted to account for inflation and possible 
increases in the overall level of wages. In this sense, workers’ 
compensation systems grant damages in the abstract, independent of the 
facts of the case. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has famously held 
that a worker who, subsequent to the injury, underwent re-training and 
managed to earn three times his pre-injury salary was nonetheless entitled 
to partial disability benefits.24 
A striking difference between the damages available under tort and the 
benefits due under workers’ compensation is that the latter excludes 
compensation for nonpecuniary harm, in particular, damages for pain and 
suffering. Likewise, while some jurisdictions entertain regimes of punitive 
damages in tort claims, this remedy is not available in workers’ 
compensation, so injured workers never receive monetary benefits beyond 
those in the form of pensions. 
E. Resolution of Disputes Out of Court 
The concentration of liability in a single entity, be it a public workers’ 
compensation carrier or a private insurance company that is overseen by an 
administrative agency, makes it easier to implement special procedures for 
the purpose of resolving disputes. While institutions and procedures vary 
across jurisdictions, they all share central features of alternative dispute 
resolution.25 Typically, the aggrieved worker files her claim with the 
competent workers’ compensation carrier who, in case of approval, will 
provide immediate relief in the form of medical care and income 
replacement. If the claim is rejected and a dispute arises, special dispute 
resolution boards will investigate the case and, depending on the 
 
 23.  LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 52–58 (describing the calculation of income substitution for fully 
disabled workers provided under workers’ compensation schemes in the United States); LAMBERT-
FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, ¶378 (describing the calculation of income substitution for 
fully disabled workers provided under workers’ compensation schemes in France). 
 24.  See Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 138–39 (1997) (holding that “a worker is 
entitled to nominal compensation when his work-related injury has not diminished his present wage-
earning capacity under current circumstances, but there is a significant potential that the injury will 
cause diminished capacity under future conditions”). 
 25.  This is also true in those jurisdictions of the US where workers’ compensation schemes are 
based on the market solution of mandatory liability insurance. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.34, 
at 159–60; LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 58–63. 
WAGNER.FINAL.V3 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  11:58 AM 
10 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 23:1 
jurisdiction, either propose a settlement or enter a binding decision. While 
such decisions may always be challenged in a court of law, such non-
judicial processes help to settle the majority of disputes without court 
intervention and thus lowers the overall administrative costs of workers’ 
compensation systems as compared to the tort system.26 
F.  Immunity of Employers from Damages Suits 
The flipside of no-fault liability of workers’ compensation carriers for 
the consequences of work-related injuries and diseases is employer 
immunity.27 If, after obtaining workers’ compensation benefits, the worker 
could bring private claims against her employer, the worker would receive 
double compensation. Conversely, employers would have not only to fund 
the system of workers’ compensation but also to shoulder the costs of 
individual damages claims brought against them. The costs of this double 
recovery would eventually have to come out of the pockets of the 
employees themselves who would have to accept lower wages. For these 
reasons, workers’ compensation systems generally bar individual actions 
against employers, making the claim against the workers’ compensation 
carrier the sole remedy. 
There are several ways for victims to escape the limitations of 
workers’ compensation benefits and to recover full tort damages. One is to 
rely on the exceptions to the principle of employer immunity that many 
legal systems allow in cases of aggravated fault.28 Another path that leads 
out of the immunity principle, which has been used extensively in the 
United States, is to sue third parties (other than the employer), which 
contributed to the injury or disease. The incentive to collect fully 
compensatory and additional punitive damages explains the surge in suits 
against manufacturers of industrial installations, equipment, tools, and raw 
materials, in cases involving workplace accidents and occupational 
diseases.29 
 
 26.  See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 27.  See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.23, at 85–86, § 6.35, at 166–72 (describing 
conditions for employer immunity in the United States); Code de la sécurité sociale [Social Security 
Code] Art. L451-1 (Fr.) (providing for employer immunity in France for damages for injuries and 
diseases as described therein); LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, ¶ 381 (describing 
conditions for employer immunity in France); KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 234–36. (describing 
conditions for employer immunity in Germany). 
 28.  ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.23, at 85–6, § 6.36, at 174–76.  
 29.  Infra, Part VI C. 
WAGNER_MACRO_PROOF 11/21/12 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  11:58 AM 
2012 TORT, SOCIAL SECURITY, AND NO-FAULT SCHEMES 11 
II. EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY: BASIC FEATURES 
A. Liability in Contract and Tort 
The basic elements of workers’ compensation systems have been set 
out above. The alternative is a system of more or less pure employers’ 
liability. In such a world, the employer is personally liable for the damage 
sustained by his employees, in the same way that he is liable to third 
parties. It is a matter of argument whether such liability would result in a 
contractual claim or in a claim in tort. Civil law systems will ground the 
action primarily or even exclusively in the law of contract,30 i.e., in the 
employment contract. In contrast, common law jurisdictions (like England) 
seem to base it on tort, albeit with strong contractual flavors.31 
B. Four Features of Private Liability Systems 
While the differences between a contract and a tort approach may be 
important in theory, they remain inconsequential in practice. Under both 
theories, liability for the consequences of workplace accidents and 
occupational diseases shares four common features of private claims for 
damages:32 First, the responsibility of the employer is based on fault, i.e. on 
a failure to take the requisite care in the organization of the business and of 
the work flow, the equipment of the workplace, and the training of workers. 
Second, where liability has been established, the defense of contributory 
negligence remains available to the defendant. Third, however, if the victim 
succeeds, she is entitled to full compensation of pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary losses. Damages are calculated in every single case and not 
awarded on the basis of statutory schedules and grids. Fourth, disputes are 
resolved by the civil courts, without prior involvement of ADR-like dispute 
resolution boards. 
C. The Trinity of Defenses 
These four features of employers’ liability each pose rich and highly 
complex sets of sub-issues that are absent from workers’ compensation 
 
 30.  SIEWERT D. LINDENBERGH, ARBEIDSONGEVALLEN EN BEROEPSZIEKTEN, 10, ¶ 7.2 (2nd ed. 
2009) (Ger.) (citing Art. 7:658 Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek [NBW] [Civil Code] (Ger.).; Cour de 
Cassation [Cass.] (supreme court for judicial matters) soc., Oct. 11, 1994, D. [Recueil Dalloz] 1995, 
440 (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Oct. 28, 1997, D. 1998, 
219 (Fr.); JEAN PÉLISSIER, ALAIN SUPIOT & ANTOINE JEAMMAUD, DROIT DU TRAVAIL [LABOR LAW], 
¶986 (22nd ed. 2004). 
 31.  See Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co., Ltd. v. English, [1938] A.C. 57 (H.L.) 78 (U.K.); Harris v. 
Brights Asphalt Contractors, [1953] 1 Q.B. 617 at 626; W. V. HORTON ROGERS, WINFIELD & 
JOLOWICZ ON TORT, 413–15, 424–27 (18th ed. 2010). 
 32.  Cf. ROGERS, supra note 31, at 424–38. 
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systems. The requirement of establishing fault on the part of the employer 
requires courts to set the requisite standard of care, which may be a 
difficult determination to make. Another complex task is to determine the 
scope of liability in cases where the harm was caused by the negligence of 
a fellow employee,33 and when the employee was guilty of contributory 
negligence.34 The well-established tort doctrines of vicarious liability and 
contributory fault provided anchors for the holy—or, rather, “unholy”—
trinity of defenses available to the employer under late–nineteenth-century 
law: the fellow-servant rule, assumption of risk, and contributory 
negligence.35 The scope of vicarious liability of employers for harm caused 
by one employee to another had been seriously curtailed by the so-called 
“doctrine of common employment” or the “fellow-servant rule,” which 
exonerated the employer from liability for workplace accidents caused by 
another member of the workforce, provided that the fellow employee was 
not charged with organizing and ensuring the safety of the workplace. Even 
where the victim succeeded in establishing a prima facie case against the 
employer, she was still subject to the defenses of assumption of risk and 
contributory negligence. Thus, the injured employee lost her claim for 
compensation if the accident in question involved negligence on her own 
part, but also where it appeared to be a natural consequence of the general 
risk caused by the plant or operation in question. 
Interestingly, the two European jurisdictions that revived employers’ 
liability and abandoned workers’ compensation were careful to leave the 
unholy trinity of defenses dormant in their graves.36 In the modern law of 
employers’ liability in England and the Netherlands, respondeat superior 
has trumped the “fellow-servant rule,” assumption of risk has been 
abolished, and contributory fault has been limited to a narrow set of cases 
involving egregious behavior by the employee. 
D. Full Compensation 
If the claimant succeeds in establishing the elements of liability, she is 
entitled to full compensation of losses incurred, including damages for pain 
 
 33.  Id. at 374.   
 34.  Id. at 384. 
 35.  Id. at 363–88; Richard Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers’ 
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 775–76 (1982) (“During the nineteenth century . . . negligence 
was regarded as the proper basis of liability, the requirements of the employee’s prima facie case were 
not the principal issue. Instead the legal battle raged over the famous trinity of defenses: contributory 
negligence of the employee, assumption of risk and common employment.”). The situation under the 
old law is nicely described in New York Cent. R.R.Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, at 198–201 (1917) 
(holding that New York state’s workers’ compensation act did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 36.  See infra Part IV.C.  
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and suffering and loss of amenities. Lost earnings will be replaced in full, 
with the size of the award depending exclusively on the decrease in 
earnings caused by the accident or disease. This calculation requires 
difficult projections about the earning prospects of the claimant in the 
impaired versus the hypothetically unimpaired state of the world. In legal 
systems that permit punitive damages, the victim of a tort may recover 
damages in excess of her loss, provided that the defendant is guilty of 
aggravated fault, i.e., acted recklessly or with an intention to harm others. 
E. Dispute Resolution through Litigation 
Disputes that cannot be resolved by the parties out of court are dealt 
with under the normal procedures of the civil justice system. While these 
may seem adequate or even superior to the services of special tribunals set 
up to dispose of claims brought in workers’ compensation, they consume 
more resources, and they take much longer to dispose of a case.37 
F. No Insurance and Collectivization of Claims 
Private systems of liability, regardless of whether they are based on 
contract or tort, are powerless to ensure the actual satisfaction of claims for 
damages. The victim bears the risk that, at the time of suit or judgment, the 
tortfeasor or other responsible party may no longer exist or may be 
insolvent. While the risk of insolvency could be captured by a statutory 
mandate to take out liability insurance, there is no general duty on firms to 
do so. Even if such a duty were introduced, it would be powerless to deal 
with situations where the employee switched from one employer to the next 
over the course of her worklife so that it is impossible to attribute the loss 
to one particular employer and his insurance carrier. 
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
The choice between workers’ compensation and employers’ liability 
involves a whole range of complex policy issues. For the purpose of 
analyzing these issues, economic analysis offers by far the most elaborate 
and systematic framework. Surprisingly, however, workers’ compensation 
has remained a rather barren spot within the landscape of economic 
analysis. While the topic was discussed in the early days of law-and-
economics scholarship,38 modern treatments are generally lacking. Given 
 
 37.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 38.  Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 44–46, 67–71 (1972); 
James R. Chelius, Liability for Industrial Accidents: A Comparison of Negligence and Strict Liability 
Systems, 5 J. LEGAL. STUD. 293, 298–307 (1976); see also Price V. Fishback, Liability Rules and 
Accident Prevention in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from the Early Twentieth Century, 16 J. 
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the preference of economic theory for market solutions and private 
ordering, it seems that workers’ compensation systems, which substitute 
the individual action against the employer with a claim against a private or 
public insurance carrier and even dispense with the defense of comparative 
negligence are unattractive. However, a closer analysis reveals that things 
are not as simple and that workers’ compensation systems may indeed fare 
much better than anticipated. 
A. Efficient Deterrence 
1. Efficient Deterrence from a Torts Perspective 
Those jurisdictions that have replaced workers’ compensation and 
revivified employers’ liability have universally adopted the fault principle. 
It seems that this choice was made intuitively, without much reasoning 
about the trade-offs involved. Lawmakers may have thought that fault-
based employers’ liability was something of a natural supplement to the 
protection granted by social insurance programs which, of course, do not 
require the victim to establish wrongdoing on the part of someone. 
In fact, the choice between liability rules is not that easy. Traditional 
economic analysis suggests that the difference between fault-based and 
strict liability does not affect incentives to take care.39 Under the 
assumptions that courts set the standard of care at the efficient level, 
injurers (employers) will be led to take care because doing so avoids 
liability altogether. Confronted with the choice either to take efficient 
precautions and bear the costs of these precautions or to take less than 
efficient precautions and bear the costs of diminished precautions plus the 
costs of accidents caused by his actions, the rational employer will take 
efficient precautions. Under a rule of strict liability, the employer bears the 
costs of any accidents caused in the course of employment without being 
able to exonerate himself by establishing his diligence. However, he still 
has an incentive to take care to the extent that the costs of precautions are 
lower than the costs of accidents avoided by taking such precautions. In 
other words, under strict liability the potential injurer has an incentive to 
adhere to the same precautionary standard he would be held to under a 
negligence regime. Therefore, both principles of attributing liability 
theoretically work equally well with regard to care levels. 
A second concern of liability rules is to generate efficient activity 
 
LEGAL STUD. 305 (1987).  
 39.  See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5–32 (1987) (discussing 
basic theory of liability and deterrence); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 226–27 
(8th ed. 2011). 
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levels. The activity level denotes the amount or quantity of a potentially 
dangerous activity, given a particular liability rule. The goal is to make sure 
that potential injurers engage in dangerous activities only up to the point 
where the gain from another unit of the activity is equal to the loss in terms 
of additional accident costs, assuming that efficient care has been taken. In 
the case of a business entity, the price charged for its goods and services 
should reflect the full costs of production, including the costs of any harm 
caused in the course of production.40 If the fault principle is applied, firms 
would be able to deny responsibility for any damage caused, so long as 
appropriate care had been taken. Since victims, not employers, would bear 
the costs of the residual harm that was caused in spite of precautions, the 
balance sheet of the firm would not reflect the full costs of production. Part 
of the risks associated with the products and services offered by the firm 
would be externalized to victims who sustained injuries as a consequence 
of diligent behavior. In turn, firms would not need to account for these 
costs in setting prices, thus causing prices for the goods and services 
supplied to be too low. As demand is inversely correlated with price, 
demand for such goods and services would be too high. In effect, the 
economy would produce more goods and services than it should in light of 
the total costs of production, including the damage caused to third parties.  
In order to avoid the misallocation of resources implicit in excessive 
demand, “the cost of the production should bear the blood of the 
workman.”41 Thus, in returning those costs from the victim to the firm in 
order to generate efficient activity levels, a regime of strict employer 
liability seems to be preferable to its fault-based alternative. 
2. Efficient Deterrence in Employment Relationships 
a) Coasean Bargaining 
The line of argument sketched above ignores the fact that workplace 
accidents and occupational diseases are different from ordinary tort cases, 
for the reason that victim and injurer are in a contractual relationship with 
one another. This feature is important, because in a setting where 
transactions costs, including the costs of information, are zero, the parties 
will invariably reach the efficient result through bargaining, regardless of 
the initial placement of liability. The attribution of costs associated with a 
particular liability rule, if efficient, will be replicated in the bargain of the 
parties or, if inefficient, will be pushed aside. In essence, this is the 
 
 40.  SHAVELL, supra note 39, at 48–51. 
 41.  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 573 (5th  ed. 1984) (footnote 
omitted). 
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reasoning that became known as the Coase theorem.42 
Applied to the employment contract, the question is how the employer 
and employee would allocate the risk of workplace accidents and 
occupational diseases if they made this issue the subject of their bargain.  
Take first the example of a system where employers are immune from 
liability.  If both employer and employee are perfectly informed about the 
probability and severity of harm, the wage negotiated by the parties will 
include a premium that reflects the expected value of the harm.43 Wage 
premiums that accurately reflect the level of expected harm are equivalent 
to damages payments due under a liability system. They increase the costs 
of production by the expected costs of harm and generate incentives to 
drive down overall costs by reducing expected harm. The employer may 
reduce expected harm in the two ways familiar from tort analysis: (1) by 
taking precautions; or (2) by reducing activity levels, i.e., by hiring fewer 
workers. Where the wage plus the premium necessary to induce employees 
to accept a given level of risk is higher than the value generated by the 
work of this particular employee, the employer will abstain from hiring. 
This, in fact, is precisely what the efficient employer should do. Thus, 
under the assumption that the parties to the employment relationship are 
perfectly informed about the risk of harm involved in the job at issue, the 
employer faces the right incentives to take care and to adjust the activity 
level so that optimal deterrence obtains. 
The presence of a liability scheme alters the dynamics of the parties’ 
negotiations as the employee discounts the expected costs imposed by 
workplace accidents and occupational diseases by an amount equal to the 
expected damages payments due to him in case of injury. If the risk of 
injury is held constant and all else is equal, the presence of liability will 
reduce the wage premium paid under the respective employment contract, 
as the demand for labor depends on the total costs of employment and not 
only on the cash wages received by the employee.44 Obviously, the effect 
that the expected costs of compensating workers reduce aggregate salary 
(wage plus premium) is independent from the nature of the liability regime 
in question, whether it is workers’ compensation or employers’ liability. 
 
 42.  Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).  
 43.  MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. KIP VISCUSI, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS: 
WAGES, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY 13–20 (1990) (describing wage-risk 
tradeoffs, where research “indicate[s] that market mechanisms play a fundamental role in determining 
both the allocation of workers to jobs and their compensation in those jobs”).  
 44.  See MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 22–23 (describing wage-benefit tradeoffs in the role 
of workers’ compensation); empirical evidence of the passing on of the costs of liability to nonunion 
workers in the mining industry is presented in Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, Did Workers 
Pay for the Passage of Workers’ Compensation Laws?, 110 Q. J. ECON. 713, 714 (1995).  
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The reduction in the wage premium will certainly be more pronounced 
where liability is strict and generous damages are offered, and less 
pronounced where liability is contingent on a showing of fault and damages 
are under-compensatory. In addition, the costs involved in the 
administration of a compensation system will depress wage premiums, too. 
More efficient systems of liability will, therefore, lead to higher damages 
levels or to higher wages than less efficient ones. All that can be said from 
this perspective is that employers and employees would prefer more cost-
efficient liability systems to less cost-efficient ones. 
In conclusion, the liability rule does not seem to matter at all. Absent 
liability, the higher the risk of injury caused by a given job, the higher the 
wage premium will be that the employee is able to negotiate, and vice 
versa. Firms will always internalize the full costs of accidents and diseases, 
either in the form of wage premiums to be paid to all members of the 
workforce ex ante, or in the form of damages payments paid to those 
actually injured ex post or in any combination of both.45 From this 
perspective, a system of no liability generates the same incentives to take 
care and to adjust activity levels as a system of fault-based or strict liability 
employers’ liability would. 
b) Bargaining in the Real World 
Note, however, that this conclusion only holds where transaction costs 
are negligible. In the real world, such low- or zero-cost situations are rare. 
Major sources of transaction costs are the costs of gathering, processing, 
and analyzing information that is relevant to the transaction at stake.46 
Where at least one of the parties lacks relevant information, bargaining 
may not lead to efficient outcomes. The efficient allocation of the costs of 
harm caused by workplace accidents and occupational diseases by means 
of contract turns on the ability of the employee to perceive the risk 
associated with a particular job, to translate it into a number equal to the 
costs of expected harm, and to calculate a wage premium that reflects the 
costs of expected harm due to occur within the period of time for which the 
wage is paid, e.g. a week or a month. While substantial empirical literature 
shows that wage premiums compensating workers for occupational hazards 
are in fact paid,47 the existence of wage premiums as such does not prove 
 
 45.  MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 53-68.  
 46.   DAVID DE MEZA, Coase Theorem, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
AND THE LAW 270, 275-278 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).  
 47.  For a summary of this literature, see  Alison Morantz, Opting Out of Workers’ Compensation 
in Texas, a Survey of Large, Multistate Nonsubscribers, in REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW 197, 208–09 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011),  
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that they adequately reflect the risks of harm associated with various jobs. 
This fact is acknowledged by the empirical literature itself, which concedes 
that the results obtained from studies “indicate that complete market failure 
does not necessarily exist,”48 but they “do not prove that risk is allocated 
efficiently by the labor market.”49 The extent of market failure due to 
misinformation about risk and other defects in the bargaining process 
remains unknown. 
For the purposes of the present analysis it is unnecessary to explore 
further the potential of employer–employee bargaining to incentivize the 
employer to take care and to adjust the activity level efficiently. That 
question remains open to empirical analysis on the degree to which workers 
are well-informed and successfully able to bargain for wage premiums. 
Rather, the crucial question to ask is whether a system combining a rule of 
employer immunity with wage premiums produces more efficient 
incentives than does a rule of strict liability. 
As a matter of policy, the first option of strict liability is preferable.50 
The employer is better positioned than the employee to gather information 
about occupational hazards and to control them by taking precautions and 
adjusting activity levels. While it is certainly true that employees might be 
better informed with regard to the risk posed by fellow employees whose 
behavior they may closely observe on a day-to-day basis,51 the employer 
enjoys informational advantages in all other areas. The employer controls 
the use of machinery and other equipment, of raw materials and energy, as 
well as the time, duration, and environmental conditions of dangerous 
activities. Given their superior information about risks posed by the factors 
and circumstances of production, employers can rationally weigh the costs 
and benefits of one course of action against another. To draw on the 
example of asbestos, it is (or was) the employer who decided to use this 
material and who controlled the circumstances of its use—e.g., the duration 
of exposure, the prompt removal of dust through ventilation, the provision 
of protective clothes and breathing aids, and the supply of showers. Each of 
these factors influenced the likelihood that dealing with asbestos on the job 
would result in the contraction of a serious disease such as asbestosis and 
mesothelioma. 
In contrast, workers will tend to have less knowledge about the 
occupational hazards to which they are exposed, since they have no 
systematic overview of the accidents and diseases caused by certain 
 
 48.  MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 15.  
 49.  Id. 
 50.  MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 121-35.  
 51.  Posner, supra note 38, at 44-45.  
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activities. Rather, their informational resources are usually restricted to 
anecdotal evidence gathered on the particular job. While this may be 
valuable, it may not be representative of the larger picture. And even where 
workers have the relevant information about the risks of injury and disease 
to which they are exposed, they lack the means for adequate and 
proportionate responses. During their employment contract, workers’ 
bargaining leverage is only based on the threat of “quitting.” While 
empirical studies have shown that the decision to quit or stay is in fact 
influenced by concerns of workplace safety,52 it has never been suggested 
that these decisions generate optimal incentives to take care on the part of 
employers. Indeed, such a claim could not be made, since most workers 
will lack relevant information and because the decision to quit or stay is 
often influenced by a range of factors other than workplace risk, such as the 
supply of labor, as expressed in the unemployment rate, and the mobility of 
the worker, which in turn is influenced by the housing market as well as the 
personal situation of the worker and her family at their current location. 
The analysis so far suggests that employers will be in a better position 
to gather information about and control occupational risks than workers. 
However, a bilateral comparison that focuses only on the two parties 
involved in the employment relationship is misplaced. In reality, workers 
may be supported by trade unions, while employers will act under the 
guidance of liability insurers. The empirical literature on labor markets 
suggests that unionized workers receive higher wages and higher workers’ 
compensation benefits, but it remains ambivalent whether the presence of 
unions increases workplace safety.53 Studies on safety standards in the 
mining industry seem to support the conclusion that unions have a positive 
effect on workplace safety in that their presence drives down accident 
rates.54 
At the other end of the spectrum, the employer does not operate in 
isolation either. There is, of course, a layer of regulatory safety standards 
set by administrative agencies or other regulators, but these may be 
disregarded in the present context, as regulatory standards affect the 
behavior of employers and employees alike. While regulation of workplace 
safety is important, none of the jurisdictions surveyed relies exclusively on 
regulation. Rather, they operate dual systems of safety regulation and 
financial incentives generated by liability rules like those underlying 
workers’ compensation schemes as well as employers’ liability regimes. 
 
 52.  MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 98-110.  
 53.  Id. at 111-20.  
 54.  Alison Morantz, Coal Mine Safety: Do Unions Make a Difference?, INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4-5) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1846700).  
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Beyond employees and regulators, liability insurers also supervise and 
control the employers they insure. Unlike first-party health and disability 
insurers, which are powerless to control occupational hazards, liability 
insurers have the means and—thanks to competition in the insurance 
market—the incentive to risk-rate employers adequately.55 Commercial 
liability insurers estimate the risk associated with the potential insured 
before underwriting, and they adjust premiums ex post through experience 
rating and retrospective rating for premiums to more finely reflect the 
insured’s actual risk. The same strategies of assessing and rating individual 
risk are employed by well-run workers’ compensation carriers.56 To the 
extent that insurance or workers’ compensation carriers succeed in setting 
premiums that adequately reflect risk, the incentives to take care and adjust 
activity levels generated by a rule of strict liability remain intact. With 
regard to emerging risks, which are yet unknown, the presence of liability 
insurers may even improve incentives over the ones that would exist 
otherwise. By insuring large numbers of firms, industrial liability insurers 
not only pool the risks associated with the operation of these firms, but they 
also pool information with regard to the risks involved. Such pooling of 
information is particularly valuable with regard to new risks which have 
not yet been appreciated by the scientific and business communities. 
In summary, employers and their liability insurers are in a better 
position to search and gather information on occupational hazards and to 
act upon such information than workers, even if the latter are organized in, 
and assisted by, trade unions. This is not to say that workers and unions are 
never able to learn about occupational hazards and act accordingly, or that 
employers and their insurers know everything and take appropriate safety 
measures. Rather, the foregoing analysis merely suggests that employers 
and liability insurers (and, for that matter, workers’ compensation carriers) 
are in a relatively better position to act in the interest of safety. Even under 
optimistic assumptions, it is difficult to imagine how the wage premium 
implicit in an employment contract could fluctuate over time so as to fairly 
accurately track and reflect changes in workplace safety that occur over the 
course of the employment relationship. In effect, wages would have to 
fluctuate much like premiums under liability insurance contracts in order to 
achieve the same incentives to control risk on the part of the employer. It is 
reasonable to assume that such dynamic matching of wages and job risks is 
 
 55.  Gerhard Wagner, Tort Law and Liability Insurance, in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 377, 386-
87 (Michael G. Faure ed., 2010).  
 56.  Cf. LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 98-104; MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 25; Hein Kötz & 
Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Schadensverhütung durch ökonomische Anreize: Eine empirische Untersuchung, 
189 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS [AcP] 501 (1989) (describing the German System).  
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not achieved in practice. 
c) Empirical Evidence for the Efficiency of Workers’ Compensation 
Systems 
The conclusion that workers’ compensation systems do a better job 
than the opposite rule of no liability finds support in empirical studies 
comparing the accident rates under workers’ compensation with those 
achieved under the systems of employers’ liability, which workers’ 
compensation replaced.57 With the introduction of workers’ compensation 
schemes,  the number of claims for minor injuries tended to rise, while the 
death-rate and the number of serious injuries declined significantly.58 The 
obvious explanation is that workers’ compensation, by introducing strict 
liability and awarding benefits independent of actual loss, increased moral 
hazard, leading to more frequent claims for minor injuries.59 Deaths and 
serious injuries are much less likely to fall prey to moral hazard and are 
therefore a much more reliable indicator of the performance of workers’ 
compensation systems. And it is precisely in this area of serious injuries 
that these schemes shine, evidencing their beneficial effects on workplace 
safety. 
3. Efficient Employee Behavior 
a) Irrelevance of Contributory Fault 
Current systems of tort liability routinely provide for the defenses of 
contributory or comparative negligence within regimes of strict liability. 
Strikingly, workers’ compensation systems diverge from this practice and 
follow the opposite rule of disallowing the defense of contributory fault, 
save for narrow exceptions. The latter is understood here to encompass 
both the doctrine of contributory negligence in a technical sense (which 
bars the claim against the injurer upon the establishment of victim 
negligence), and the doctrine of comparative negligence (which reduces the 
 
 57.  For a summary of these studies, see DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 1, at 381-82. 
Given that schemes providing for broad and generous protection of workers from occupational risk 
generate both more moral hazard and stronger incentives to take care, and that the only observable data 
for researchers are the number and value of claims, it is very difficult to isolate the effects of workers’ 
compensation schemes. Cf. Morantz, supra note 47 at 209-10. And even where it can be done, the 
question remains: compared to what? Systems of employers’ liability vary widely, not only with regard 
to the scope of liability and defences such as common employment and contributory negligence, but 
also in the area of damages levels and enforcement. In Texas, for example, where employers may opt 
out of workers’ compensation, practically all of the firms that used this option resorted to mandatory 
arbitration for resolution of disputes. Cf. Morantz, supra note 47, at 223, 230. 
 58.  MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 121-35.  
 59.  Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really 
Deter?, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 377, 392-93 (1994). 
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damages claim in proportion to the degree and weight of the victim’s 
contribution).60 In contrast, workers’ compensation carriers are liable for 
the financial consequences of the harm suffered by the victim regardless of 
fault on the part of the employer, and regardless of negligence of the 
employee-victim. The claim only fails if the victim inflicted the injury 
upon herself intentionally.61 While some jurisdictions provide for a 
reduction of the damages claims where the victim also acted recklessly or 
inexcusably, generally courts seem very reluctant to apply this rule to reject 
or reduce damages claims of employees.62 
b) The Importance of Employee Behavior for Efficient Deterrence 
From the perspective of deterrence, the defense of contributory 
negligence is essential for regimes of strict liability to yield efficient 
outcomes.63  General economic theory maintains that a regime of strict 
liability lacking the defense of contributory fault leads to undesirable 
outcomes, i.e., too many accidents, within settings of bilateral causation. 
The case of occupational hazards clearly involves a situation where both 
the potential injurer and the potential victim may affect the probability and 
severity of accidents through their respective behavior. While the employer 
chooses the equipment and raw materials, as well as the organization of the 
workplace and of the production process, the day-to-day operations inside 
the plant engage the employee. Without the diligent cooperation of 
workers, safe working conditions are impossible to achieve. Although the 
employee typically operates within the sphere of the employer, constant 
supervision and control are impossible. Therefore, the law needs to 
incentivize both parties, employer and employee, to take precautions in 
order to achieve the goal of optimal workplace safety. Against this 
background, it is all the more striking that workers’ compensation systems 
hold employers strictly liable without holding employees accountable for 
contributory fault. It may seem that employees in their role as potential 
victims lack any incentive to take care, and will therefore fail to take 
efficient precautions to avoid the injury in the first place. 
 
 60.  Cf. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 494-506.  
 61.  See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN, CRAVER, SCHROEDER & SHOBEN, supra note 8, § 6.11 (regarding the 
US policy on intentional workplace injuries); KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at ¶ 586 (regarding the 
German policy on intentional workplace injuries); LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, 
at ¶ 387 (regarding the French policy on workplace injuries intentionally caused by the victim).  
 62.  See, e.g., Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Jan. 27, 2004, 
Bull. civ. II,  No. 25; Cass. ass. plén. [supreme court for judicial matters, en banc], Jun 24, 2005, JCPS 
(Jurisclasseur Périodique Social) 2005, 1056; LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, at ¶ 
387.  
 63.  SHAVELL, supra note 39, at 9-21.  
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c) Justifying the Disregard for Contributory Negligence 
There are several explanations that mitigate the tension between 
economic principles and the set-up of workers’ compensation. First, 
incentives to avoid loss may be less important where injury or other harm 
to one’s own body is concerned.64 Most workers have an intrinsic incentive 
to avoid losing an arm, a leg or an eye, even if they are promised sizable 
financial compensation. This is not to deny that full employer liability 
without regard to contributory fault does weaken the incentives on the part 
of workers to take care. Evidence from no-fault schemes in the area of 
traffic accidents suggests that there is a detrimental effect on potential 
victims’ incentives to take care.65 The point is only that this effect may be 
smaller than it would be with other kinds of harm such as property damage 
or financial losses. 
Second, it is misleading to think of the payments available under 
workers’ compensation as the “fair price” paid in exchange for inflicting 
the harm in question. The bargain implicit in workers’ compensation 
schemes involves a broad liability rule and a rather parsimonious quantum 
rule. The worker who suffered harm never recovers in full; she receives 
compensation of her financial losses only. In addition, the award of 
damages is not assessed on a case-by-case basis but drawn from a schedule 
of disabilities and associated benefits, regardless of the actual amount of 
lost earnings incurred by the individual victim. For this reason, the liability 
rule implicit in workers’ compensation has been described as one of 
“shared strict liability”;66 a better characterization would be “partial strict 
liability.” Far from providing full compensation to the victim, workers’ 
compensation schemes provide limited compensation in the form of pre-
fixed benefits and thus leave a significant part of the incentives to protect 
oneself from bodily harm and disease intact.67 
In spite of these optimistic findings, there is room for improvement. 
As explained below, there is no systematic link between the level of 
compensation and the associated degree of undercompensation, on one 
hand, and the preservation of the worker’s incentives to take care, on the 
other.68 If anything, current workers’ compensation systems generate a 
backwards incentive structure. As the system is set up today, victims of 
minor injuries stand to receive damages in excess of the harm caused, while 
 
 64.  MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 29.  
 65.   DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 1, at 25-26, 415-16 (summarizing empirical 
studies).  
 66.  Chelius, supra note 38, at 300-01.  
 67.  Epstein, supra note 35, at 800-01.  
 68.  See infra Part VI.B.  
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those who suffer serious harm are being undercompensated. However, the 
prospect of receiving compensation will more severely impact the victim’s 
incentives to take care in cases of minor injuries than in cases involving 
major ones. In addition, minor injuries are particularly vulnerable to ex post 
moral hazard in the form of false claims and fake injuries. Therefore, 
limited liability in the form of undercompensation is required most in cases 
of minor injuries, not major ones, but it is precisely here that the system 
fails. A decrease in benefits for minor injuries would mitigate these 
problems, and therefore benefit the overall viability of the system.69 
With regard to serious injuries, it is essential to focus on the basic 
justification for the system’s disregard for contributory fault. It rests on the 
recognition that, since mistakes and lapses of attention are inevitable in 
day-to-day life, allowing the contributory negligence defense, or its 
comparative negligence companion, would lead to decreased damages 
claims in routine cases.70 This concern is particularly acute in the area of 
occupational risks: since workers spend a large part of their lives at work, it 
is a statistical certainty that even the most diligent worker will make 
mistakes and have momentary lapses of concentration once in a while. 
Furthermore, the worker is typically not in a position to take durable 
precautions that minimize the risk of lapses and mistakes as it is the 
employer who controls the organization, equipment, and staffing of the 
workplace.71 If these considerations form the basis for excluding the 
contributory negligence defense, then it would make sense to limit this 
exclusion to cases of simple negligence, i.e., a lapse or mistake that, in 
itself, could and should have been avoided but that belongs to a class of 
lapses and mistakes that will inevitably occur over the course of a work-
life. Conversely, the defense of comparative negligence should be 
available, and damages claims of victims be reduced, where the behavior 
cannot be excused as an unavoidable lapse of concentration but rather 
involves conscious disregard of safety rules and the standards of reasonable 
 
 69.  For details, see infra Part VI.B. 
 70.  Caswell v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd., [1940] A.C. 152 (H.L) 178-79 (Lord 
Wright) (appeal from Eng.): “What is all-important is to adapt the standard of what is negligence to the 
facts, and to give due regard to the actual conditions under which men work in a factory or mine . . . . 
The policy of the statutory protection would be nullified if a workman were held debarred from 
recovering because he was guilty of some carelessness or inattention to his own safety, which though 
trivial in itself threw him into the danger consequent on the breach by his employer of the statutory 
duty.”); see also Staveley Iron & Chem. Co. Ltd. v Jones, [1956] A.C. 627 (H.L) 648 (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
 71.  As to the distinction between durable and nondurable precautions and the risks of inattention, 
thoughtlessness and forgetfulness that disproportionately affect the latter, see Mark F. Grady, Why are 
People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 
Nw. U.L. Rev. 293, 302-10 (1988).  
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behavior. The crucial question is whether the worker made a conscious 
decision to engage in unreasonable behavior or whether the accident was 
caused by an unconscious lapse of concentration. The Georgia Supreme 
Court succinctly described the necessary elements in holding that “willful 
misconduct includes all conscious or intentional violations of definite law 
or rules of conduct, as distinguished from inadvertent, unconscious, or 
involuntary violations.”72 
While it seems that no jurisdiction running a workers’ compensation 
system openly embraces the distinction between unavoidable lapses of 
concentration and conscious disregard for safety, they differ as to their 
resistance to such an approach. Where the claim of the worker may only be 
denied upon proof of intentional infliction of harm, it remains difficult to 
interpret this exception in ways compatible with the proposition made here. 
Workers’ compensation systems which allow for the rejection of claims 
where it is established that the worker acted in conscious disregard of 
safety rules and safety instructions, are much more amenable to a 
functional reinterpretation of that concept in light of the distinction 
between statistically unavoidable lapses of attention and conscious 
disregard of safety requirements. The same is true for systems like the 
French one, which expand the exception to cases of inexcusable negligence 
and allow for a mere reduction of the workers’ claims. To the present day, 
however, the French courts are unwilling to apply the clause vigorously,73 
as would  preserve the incentives of workers to take care and to avoid 
harm. 
B. Efficient Risk Bearing 
1. Wage Premiums and Strict Liability Compared 
Regimes of no liability and strict liability differ from one another not 
only with regard to efficient deterrence, but also in how they assign the 
residual risk of harm, i.e., the risk that remains even after efficient 
precautions have been taken. Strict liability functions like an insurance plan 
offered by an employer to its workers. Whenever the worker suffers losses 
as a consequence of workplace accidents or occupational diseases, the 
employer is liable to compensate her. The risk of accidents and disease, at 
least as to their financial consequences, is borne by the employer. 
Under a rule of no liability the employee bears the risk of workplace 
accidents and occupational diseases. Whenever such a risk materializes and 
 
 72.  Roy v. Norman, 404 S.E.2d 117, 118 (Ga. 1991) (emphasis omitted). Regrettably, the court 
made this definition part of a four-prong test rather than making it conclusive. See id. 
 73.  See supra note 62. 
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results in a serious injury or disease, the worker receives no redress from 
her employer, because she has already been compensated for her loss in the 
form of wage premiums collected through the months and years preceding 
the accident or illness. 
The decision between the two regimes of no liability and strict liability 
seems to be straightforward. It is reasonable to assume that workers will 
generally be risk averse with regard to the potentially dire consequences of 
accidents and diseases.74 Therefore, they would prefer to be insured against 
the risk of such harm. This is precisely what a system of strict liability 
provides for; it requires employers to insure their employees against 
personal injury. It does not matter that employers may be risk averse too, as 
they in turn can shift the risk of liability to a liability insurer in exchange 
for a premium. 
The conclusion that strict liability is preferable on grounds of risk 
allocation is still premature, however. First, it ignores the fact that the 
worker need not insure the risk of harm with her employer; instead, she 
might buy coverage for the costs of health care and for income replacement 
on the insurance market. At the time when workers’ compensation schemes 
were introduced in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, most 
workers were unable to buy first-party insurance to protect themselves 
against accidents and diseases for which the employer could not be held 
liable.75 At that time, the introduction of workers’ compensation clearly 
contributed to efficient risk bearing. Today, this situation has changed, as 
health insurance and disability insurance are well-established lines of the 
insurance industry and readily available for (almost) everyone who 
demands them. Within the wage premium model, workers will negotiate a 
higher wage for accepting increased risks of injury or disease and then turn 
around and use this premium to cover the risk of such contingencies by 
taking out first-party health and disability insurance. Thus, from the 
perspective of the risk-averse worker, the choice is not really between 
insurance or no insurance, but between insurance on account of the 
employer and bundled together with the contract for employment or market 
insurance bought on the market and paid for with the help of wage 
premiums due under the employment contract.76 
A second reason why strict liability need not be superior to no liability 
in terms of risk allocation is that employers might be risk-averse. To the 
extent that this is true, a rule of no liability is superior because it lets harms 
 
 74.  SHAVELL, supra note 39, at 189.  
 75.  Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, Precautionary Savings, Insurance, and the 
Origins of Workers’ Compensation, 104 J. POL. ECON. 419 (1996).  
 76.  See infra Part IV.A2.  
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lie where they fall and thus preserves risk spreading, while strict liability 
leads to a pooling of risks in the lap of the respective employer. But again, 
this conclusion ignores the availability of insurance, this time in the form of 
liability insurance. Risk-averse employers may easily cover the risk of loss 
in the insurance market, while risk-neutral employers will choose to self-
insure. In this regard, workers’ compensation does not make a difference 
since it works much like liability insurance. In fact, most U.S. jurisdictions 
operate workers’ compensation systems within a market setting: the 
insurance industry covers the liabilities of employers under workers’ 
compensation schemes.77 
As a consequence, the real options are strict employer liability plus 
liability insurance or workers’ compensation, on the one hand, and 
employer immunity plus wage premiums negotiated by workers, on the 
other. More precisely, the search for the optimal liability system for 
workplace accidents and occupational diseases reduces to a binary choice 
between two systems: One contains the elements of (1) strict liability, (2) 
liability insurance, and (3) no wage premiums. In the alternative system, 
(1) the employer faces no liability, but (2) pays wage premiums reflecting 
the risk of harm, which (3) the employee then applies to the premiums due 
under health and disability insurance policies bought on the market. In 
today’s economy, which includes well-developed insurance markets for 
both first-party health and disability insurance and third-party liability 
insurance, the policy of efficient risk allocation seems to yield inconclusive 
results. As both parties can insure the risk in question, a comparison of the 
risk attitudes of the parties concerned does not lead to a definitive answer. 
This does not mean the choice between strict liability and no liability 
should disregard efficient risk spreading altogether; rather, the analysis 
must focus on choosing, or at least facilitating the use of, the most efficient 
insurance mechanism. In this regard, and with a view to occupational 
hazards, a rule of strict liability is preferable because it better combines the 
objectives of efficient deterrence and efficient insurance. As explained 
above, the denial of employers’ liability would distort the employers’ 
incentives to take care and thus undermine workplace safety.78 Workers 
and their first-party insurers cannot effectively control and reduce the ex 
ante risks of workplace injury. By contrast, under strict liability, employers 
and their liability insurers would do a better job of providing workplace 
safety than workers and their health and disability insurers could. For the 
same reasons, liability insurance for employers would be more efficient and 
 
 77.  See supra Part II.B notes 12-15. 
 78.  See supra Part IV.A.2b), c). 
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available at lower prices than first-party insurance for workers. 
2. Fault-Based Liability vs. Strict Liability 
The goal of efficient risk bearing also informs the choice between 
strict liability and liability for fault. With regard to efficient deterrence, it 
has been argued that strict liability is more desirable for its capacity to 
facilitate allocative efficiency in the market: Strict liability makes the 
employer internalize the full costs of production, which leads to truthful 
prices.79 Consumer demand responds to these prices, causing employers to 
produce only the efficient amount of a given good or service. From the 
perspective of efficient allocation of risk within a world of highly 
developed insurance markets, liability regimes that depend on fault suffer 
from their failure to clearly assign the risk of harm. While the principles of 
no liability and strict liability arrive at clear and wholesale—if opposing—
attributions of risk, regimes of fault-based liability are more ambiguous. If 
the employer takes the precautions necessary to comply with the standard 
of care, the employee bears the remaining risk of harm, while, if the 
employer fails to take the necessary precaution, the employer bears the all 
risk himself. In allowing for different outcomes that assign the risk in 
opposing ways, fault-based liability systems typically create a demand for 
insurance on both ends of the relationship. The employer will cover the risk 
imposed on him through liability insurance, and the employee will shift the 
remaining risk to health and disability insurers. The administrative costs of 
a bilateral—and, therefore, duplicative—system of insurance will be higher 
than the costs of an alternative system which creates a need only for one 
party to seek out insurance. 
The argument above may seem to be overblown, since third-party 
liability insurance and first-party accident insurance exist together and 
overlap in large areas anyway. Even though there is some variance in 
degree among jurisdictions, most people are in fact insured against the 
contingencies of injury and disease through health and disability insurers. 
At the same time, most firms have covered the risk of being held liable 
through third-party liability insurance. The lines of first-party and third-
party insurance exist alongside each other everywhere, so the perceived 
need to choose between one method of risk-pooling or the other is 
unrealistic. By making occupational hazards the sole domain of liability 
insurance or, equivalently, workers’ compensation, there may not seem to 
be much to gain in terms of administrative cost savings. But this conclusion 
ignores the fact that each area of overlap between liability and first-party 
 
 79.  See supra Part IV.A.1. 
WAGNER_MACRO_PROOF 11/21/12 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  11:58 AM 
2012 TORT, SOCIAL SECURITY, AND NO-FAULT SCHEMES 29 
insurance creates the need for estimating and allocating the cost burden 
associated with the harm in question to one side or the other. At the 
intersection of fault-based employers’ liability and comprehensive health 
and disability insurance, the costs of health insurance will depend in part on 
the scope of employers’ liability, which in turn will be a function of the 
way in which courts operate a fault-based liability system. The simpler way 
to coordinate the two systems would be to allocate the full costs of 
workplace accidents and occupational hazards to the employer and to allow 
health and disability insurers to ignore these costs altogether. 
In conclusion, the objective of efficient risk allocation does strongly 
favor one liability regime over another in settings characterized by the 
omnipresence of first-party and third-party insurance schemes for both 
potential injurers and victims alike. Even so, the total administrative costs 
of insurance will tend to be lower in an environment including strict 
liability of employers for harm caused by occupational hazards than in an 
alternative world of fault-based employers’ liability. 
C. Efficient Administration of Claims and ex post Moral Hazard 
1. The Advantage of Workers’ Compensation Systems 
Assuming that a system of strict employers’ liability may be 
justifiable and even desirable, the next question concerns the mode of 
enforcement. In theory, there are many answers to this question, but in 
reality there are only two practical solutions. One solution is the civil 
justice system that is already in place in every jurisdiction and charged with 
resolving disputes over damages claims generally. The alternative is to 
devise a separate set of institutions specifically charged with compensating 
victims of occupational hazards and processing their claims, avoiding the 
involvement of the courts of general jurisdiction. The two alternatives 
reflect the choice between systems of employers’ liability and systems of 
workers’ compensation. The civil justice system is the natural choice in 
search for an institution to resolve disputes that involve civil claims for 
damages. Conversely, workers’ compensation systems require some 
institutional grounding anyway, and these institutions are commonly 
charged not only with administering the insurance mechanism, but also 
with receiving petitions for compensation, with processing these petitions, 
and with hearing disputes where they arise. In such systems, recourse to 
courts of law is preserved as a means of last resort, and only after the 
remedies available within the administrative system have been exhausted. 
The choice between the judicial system and administrative boards as 
mechanisms for dispute resolution is closely linked to the difference 
between tort damages available upon the proof of fault and the more 
WAGNER.FINAL.V3 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  11:58 AM 
30 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 23:1 
abstract assessment of damages regardless of fault in workers’ 
compensation systems. Establishing an employer’s negligence and 
assessing damages in cases of personal injury are complex tasks that call 
for a procedural mechanism that matches up to it. Judicial proceedings in 
courts of law are the natural choice. In contrast, the liability of workers’ 
compensation carriers is strict and independent of contributory negligence, 
rendering it unnecessary to set standards of care with regard to the behavior 
of employers and employees. The assessment of damages in workers’ 
compensation does not require extensive fact-finding for the purpose of 
establishing, upon the balance of probabilities, the loss in earnings caused 
by the injury or disease in question. Rather, it suffices to establish the total 
or partial disability of the claimant in terms of an impairment of earning 
capacity and to then apply the rate of disability to the wages earned before 
the accident in question.80 The task of assessing compensation is further 
alleviated by schedules or scales that translate certain categories of harm 
into percentage figures reflecting the degree of disability. The 
determinations necessary to assess damages within such a system are 
primarily of a medical nature and may thus be made by doctors, who in 
turn work together with the dispute resolution boards of workers’ 
compensation institutions. 
It is received wisdom that private liability systems, for all their 
benefits, are very costly to operate. In fact, this is the assumption on which 
the call for no-fault plans and their promise of low administrative costs has 
always been based.81 Workers’ compensation is no exception; as Peter 
Lencsis writes: “the delay and expense associated with lawsuits, attorneys, 
and courts are among the evils that workers compensation is intended to 
remedy.”82 The idea is that the sizable savings in administrative costs will 
make the system more efficient because those in need of compensation will 
receive a larger share of the payments made by injurers and their insurers. 
The proposition that the operation of no-fault systems involves relatively 
low administrative costs seems to hold up in practice. However, the 
 
 80.  See  KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 232-33 (describing German law); LAMBERT-FAIVRE 
& PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, at ¶ 378 (describing French law); 2 LEX K. LARSON & ARTHUR 
LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, DESK EDITION, Vol. 2, § 80.02 (2010) (describing 
American law).  
 81.  See, e.g., KEETON & O’CONNELL, supra note 1, at 2, 69-71; STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING 
AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS, at 
xvii, 187-88 (1989); 1 THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS’ STUDY, ENTERPRISE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 30 (1991) (“Third-party tort insurance is extremely expensive 
to administer. Individualized decisions must be made about each defendant’s fault and each plaintiff’s 
losses, using all the procedural paraphernalia of the civil justice system. As a result, most of the claims 
expenditure dollar pays for administration rather than ending up in the hands of the victim.”). 
 82.  LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 58.  
WAGNER_MACRO_PROOF 11/21/12 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  11:58 AM 
2012 TORT, SOCIAL SECURITY, AND NO-FAULT SCHEMES 31 
numbers vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In the UK, the 
administrative costs of the industrial disablement benefit scheme are said to 
be no more than 2 percent of benefit expenditures;83 the figure for general 
social security schemes is 5 percent; while average administrative costs of 
the tort system for personal injury claims routinely exceed damages, 
sometimes by a factor of 1.8.84 In Germany, the administrative costs of the 
workers’ compensation system are around 10.5 percent of total 
expenditures.85 The latter includes not only the pure costs of processing 
claims and resolving disputes, which together amount to no more than 1 
percent of expenditures, but also the overall operating costs of the 
respective agencies charged with occupational safety regulation and 
oversight. In the United States, the share of administrative costs of 
workers’ compensation institutions is between 15 percent and 20 percent of 
total costs of claims,86 while the respective number for the tort system is 
said to be between 50 percent and 55 percent of the total costs of claims.87 
2. Containing ex post Moral Hazard and Abuse within Workers’ 
Compensation Systems 
In spite of the variance within these numbers, they confirm the view 
that workers’ compensation systems are much cheaper to operate than the 
combination of tort and liability insurance. This alone does not prove that 
the former outperform the latter, as it might be the case that the tort system 
generates more accurate results than workers’ compensation systems. In 
particular, the tort system might be better able to contain ex post moral 
 
 83.  David Walters, An International Comparison of Occupational Disease and Injury 
Compensation Schemes 5 (2009), available at http://iiac.independent.gov.uk/pdf/reports/ 
InternationalComparisonsReport.pdf. 
 84.  LORD JUSTICE RUPERT JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT 16 
para. 2.6 (2009) (regarding a sample of personal injury cases: “It can be seen that for every £1 which 
the liability insurers paid out in damages, they paid out £1.80 in claimant costs.”); see also id. at ¶19. 
4.4.  
 85.  GESCHÄFTS-UND RECHNUNGSERGEBNISSE DER GEWERBLICHEN BERUFSGENOSSENSCHAFTEN 
UND UNFALLVERSICHERUNGSTRÄGER DER ÖFFENTLICHEN HAND 2009 (Annual Report of the German 
Association of Accident Insurers, DGUV) 56, 61 (2009), available at http://www.dguv.de/inhalt/ 
zahlen/documents/GuR_Broschuere_2009.pdf.  
 86.   The most recent report of the National Academy of Social Insurance stipulates a benefits-to-
total-costs-ratio of 0.73 for 2008, which means that for every dollar paid by employers, either as self-
insurers or in the form of insurance premiums under workers’ compensation, 73 cents went to injured 
workers in the form of benefits. In other words, administrative expenses, including the administrative 
costs and profits of insurance companies, amounted to 27 percent of total expenditures. See ISHITA 
SENGUPTA, VIRGINIA RENO & JOHN F. BURTON, ,NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE, 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: BENEFITS, COVERAGE, AND COSTS, 2008, at 32 (2010), available at 
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/Workers_Comp_Report_2008.pdf.  
 87.  DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 1, at 393-94.  
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hazard and risks of abuse. Ex ante moral hazard occurs when an agent who 
is protected against the adverse consequences of harm, and whose behavior 
cannot be monitored by the principal, takes fewer precautions against harm 
than she otherwise would.88 One paradigmatic case is that victims who are 
protected against losses by a rule of strict liability reduce their own efforts 
to avoid the injury for which they will readily receive full compensation. 
The standard response of the legal system is in the form of the defenses of 
contributory or comparative negligence that allow courts to reject or reduce 
claims where the victim’s behavior contributed to the harm complained of 
and thereby shift part of the losses to the victim. As has been explained 
above, this form of moral hazard may not be very significant within the 
context of occupational hazards where the workers’ health and bodily 
integrity is at stake and where the amount of compensation falls short of 
actual losses.89 In this context, ex post moral hazard, which occurs after the 
injury, at the stage of claiming damages or benefits, remains a concern and 
tends to be much more significant.90 Where the liability of social insurance 
schemes is in question, ex post moral hazard occurs when applicants fake 
or exaggerate the severity of their injuries and diseases in order to be 
classified as (partly) disabled and thus obtain benefits that they otherwise 
would not have been eligible to receive. 
Indeed, abuse and fraud seem to be a major risk associated with no-
fault insurance schemes of any kind. Abuse is the main explanation why 
the Dutch system of public disability insurance proved unsustainable,91 
why the American public disability insurance is said to be on the verge of 
bankruptcy,92 and why the even broader scheme of accident insurance 
established in New Zealand had to be reformed with the aim of restricting 
access and scaling down benefits time and again.93 With a view to 
compensation systems that focus on occupational risks, the Californian 
 
 88.  See  Morantz, supra note 43, at 207) (describing ex ante moral hazard as “risk-bearing moral 
hazard”). 
 89.   See supra, Part IV.A.3. 
 90.  Morantz, supra note 54, at 3-4. (labeling ex post moral hazard as “claims-reporting moral 
hazard”). 
 91.  See infra Part V.B.   
 92.  Id.  
 93.  See, e.g., Richard Mahoney, New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme: A 
Reassessment, 40 AM. J. COMP. LAW 159, 168 (1992); Richard S. Miller, The Future of New Zealand’s 
Accident Compensation Scheme, 11 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 45-638 (1989); Richard S. Miller, An Analysis 
and Critique of the 1992 Changes to New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 
1070 (1993); Schwartz, supra note 59, at 420-22; PATRICK ATIYAH, THE DAMAGES LOTTERY 183 
(1997). But see Peter H. Schuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi Style, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187 (2008), for a 
more optimistic view of New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme.  Information regarding the 
plan may be found at http://www.acc.co.nz.  
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system of workers’ compensation stands out as an example for waste, 
fraud, and abuse.94 One major factor driving this abuse seems to be the 
involvement of middlemen such as cappers, lawyers, and doctors who 
collaborated in workers’ compensation mills and, in California, profited 
from a local rule holding employers liable for the costs of medical 
examinations even if the claim turned out to be invalid.95 The second major 
cause for skyrocketing costs of workers’ compensation was the recognition, 
by the competent courts, of compensable injuries and diseases, the 
existence of which are difficult or even impossible to verify.96 Pertinent 
examples include physical impairments such as back pain, whiplash and 
soft-tissue back injuries, but also purely psychiatric or mental harm that 
exists in the mind of the victim only. This is not to say that mental harm is 
fictional and should never be compensated. However, courts must remain 
sensitive to the problem that claims involving harm that is difficult to 
verify are particularly vulnerable to abuse. 
As these examples illustrate, the fact that workers’ compensation 
systems restore financial losses only and fail to make the victim whole is 
insufficient to fully discipline claimants and their advisers. Less-than-full 
compensation may be good enough to check ex ante moral hazard but it is 
rather ineffective against the dangers of ex post moral hazard: exaggerating 
or fabricating injuries. On the other hand, lawmakers and administrators 
must avoid throwing out the baby with the bathwater in making the claims 
procedures in workers’ compensation too much like civil litigation. In the 
eyes of some observers, this is the trap the old English version of workers’ 
compensation may have fallen into: “In no time at all, Workmens’ 
Compensation descended from its lofty ideals of being a no-fault social 
service into a squalid legal battlefield between trade unions and insurance 
companies, with lying, cheating and chicanery on all sides and 
astronomical expenditure on administrative, legal and medical costs.”97 
3. Balancing the Costs and Benefits of Controls against Abuse 
While the two concerns of controlling ex post moral hazard and of 
containing administrative costs incurred in the process of claims resolution 
are clearly in conflict, the conflict does seem manageable in the real world. 
Existing workers’ compensation systems seem to do a reasonable job at 
containing ex post moral hazard without letting the costs of claims 
 
 94.  Gary. T. Schwartz, Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Workers’ Compensation: The Recent 
California Experience, 52 MD. L. REV. 983 (1993).   
 95.  Id.  at 1006-07. 
 96.  Id. at 1001-03.  
 97.  O.H. Parsons, A No-Fault System?: Not Proven, 3 INDUS. 129, 137 (1974).  
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resolution spiral out of control. It seems that the clear, traceable, and 
palpable attribution of costs to employers on which the funding 
mechanisms of workers’ compensation systems are built leads to tighter 
controls and more efficient claims resolution procedures than programs 
funded out of general tax revenues and administered by an agency which is 
not answerable to any distinct group with an interest in cost control. Where 
workers’ compensation schemes have spiraled out of control, as was the 
case in California in the 1990s, there were discrete and identifiable reasons 
for these outcomes, namely lax rules which allowed for broad recognition 
of nonverifiable diseases and the over-generous compensation of the costs 
of medical examination. 
These problems may be addressed and resolved in a satisfactory 
manner. The risk of abuse can be reigned in by imposing (1) high 
recognition thresholds for difficult-to-verify injuries and diseases, and (2) a 
disciplined screening process that ensures that only genuine claims attract 
awards. Given that the focus of workers’ compensation has always been on 
physical injury and diseases caused by occupational hazards, these goals 
are clearly within reach. 
IV. REAL-WORLD CHOICES BETWEEN WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY 
A. The Motives for the Revival of Employers’ Liability 
1. Getting Rid of the “Industrial Preference” 
The economic analysis of workers’ compensation systems in the 
previous part led to the conclusion that systems of workers’ compensation 
may look rather attractive when compared to the alternative solution of 
employers’ liability. In light of this finding, it is surprising that two modern 
countries with advanced economies—the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands—defected from the dominant solution of providing a separate 
liability regime for workplace accidents and occupational injuries, instead 
re-embracing employers’ liability. The question is: why? 
Certainly, in the Netherlands as well as in the UK, local political 
predispositions and other contingent factors played a role. But there seems 
to be a common theme, namely the idea that preferential treatment of 
workers over nonworkers—the so-called “industrial preference”—is 
unwarranted.98 This proposition assumes that workers’ compensation 
 
 98.  For a contemporary explanation of industrial preference, see generally NICHOLAS J. WIKELEY 
& ANTHONY I. OGUS, THE LAW OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 717–18 (5th ed. 2005); Richard Lewis, 
Consultation and Cuts: The Review of Industrial Injuries Benefit, 2 J. SOC. WELFARE L., 330, 333–34 
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schemes operate within general systems of social security that protect every 
citizen against financial losses incurred as a consequence of personal 
injury, regardless of cause. Within such an environment, workers’ 
compensation systems have the effect of privileging workers over other 
members of society. Workers gain access to benefits exceeding those 
available under general programs of social security, such as health and 
disability insurance, while members of the general public do not. This is 
true even if the types of injury and the kinds of accident in question are 
exactly the same. If someone falls from a ladder and breaks her leg while 
painting a ceiling, she will be compensated if the accident happened at 
work, in the course of her employment, while the same injury is left 
uncompensated if the ceiling was in her own home and she painted it 
during her leisure time. From the victim’s point of view and based on her 
needs it is difficult to see the justification for the unequal treatment of these 
two cases.99 
In the context of disease, the difference in treatment accorded to the 
same affliction is even more striking. Here the question is whether the 
provision of health care, the replacement of lost earnings, and other 
benefits, should depend on the cause of the disease at all. Health insurance 
schemes, regardless of whether they are public or private, never look to the 
causes of disease or injury, but provide assistance and care regardless of the 
source that caused the need. Therefore, social-policy makers concerned 
with satisfying needs should abandon cause-based distinctions as irrelevant. 
The critical idea of lawmakers in the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands, who worked to abandon workers’ compensation, was that the 
financial needs created by bodily injuries and diseases are the same for 
everyone. The general system of social security was to be designed 
accordingly, treating every citizen equally and making the level of benefits 
contingent on needs only. Thus, all that matters in these systems is the 
severity of the injury or disease and the demand for medical treatment or 
income replacement created by it. 
2. Social Security as Basic Protection, Tort as a Supplement 
In a world dominated by needs-based social security systems, the role 
of tort law is merely supplemental. As social security satisfies the victim’s 
basic financial needs, the private law of torts merely serves to provide 
additional compensation that is not strictly necessary. Its primary function 
 
(1980). 
 99.  PETER CANE, ATIYAH'S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 355 (2006); JANE 
STAPLETON, DISEASE AND THE COMPENSATION DEBATE (1986); WIKELEY & OGUS, supra note 98, at 
717. 
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is within the area of nonpecuniary losses, which always remain outside of 
the scope of social insurance systems. This explains why in both 
jurisdictions, in English and in Dutch law, the liability of the employer is 
fault-based, not strict. Given that its primary function was to cover 
nonpecuniary losses only, the selection of the fault principle makes sense, 
as there is neither need nor justification to insure the victim on account of 
the tortfeasor through a regime of strict liability.100 Thus, somewhat 
surprisingly, systems of employers’ liability in practice do not depend 
primarily or solely on the tort system to compensate victims, and in this 
sense they are not “pure” tort systems at all. Rather, they combine broad 
coverage of needs caused by bodily injuries and diseases under social 
security schemes with the private tort action for additional damages. 
The combination of these two approaches is particularly striking in the 
law of the Netherlands. In 1967, the Netherlands, which had introduced its 
workers’ compensation system in 1901 based broadly on the original 
German model, abolished the system and reinstated the private cause of 
action of employees against employers.101 However, the need to provide for 
health care and income replacement within a short period of time after the 
accident or injury had occurred—which led to the introduction of workers’ 
compensation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—
remained valid and urgent following abolition. The Dutch lawmakers 
accommodated it by creating a general social insurance scheme that 
provided for compensation in cases of disability, or incapacity to work, 
regardless of cause. In effect, the Netherlands broadened one aspect of 
workers’ compensation—expedient provision of health care and income 
replacement—to include the population at large, while at the same time 
abandoning other aspects of it—the preferential treatment of workers and 
immunity of employers from tort actions. In essence, the Netherlands 
replaced the system of workers’ compensation, which was focused on the 
so-called professional risk (risque professionnel), with a combination of 
generous social security benefits to cover the so-called social risk (risque 
social), and supplementary employers’ liability.102 
Likewise, the development in the United Kingdom must be seen in 
light of the long-standing policy to create an all-encompassing welfare 
system, funded out of general tax revenues and providing the same benefits 
 
 100.  STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 242-43 and 269-72 
(2004). 
 101.  LINDENBERGH, supra note 30, ¶ 2; Esther F. D. Engelhard, Shifts of Work-Related Injury 
Compensation in  20 SHIFTS IN COMPENSATING WORK-RELATED INJURIES AND DISEASES 9, 41 (Saskia 
Klosse & Ton Hartlief eds., 2007).  
 102.  LINDENBERGH, supra note 30, ¶ 7.1–7.4; Engelhard, supra note 101, at 41–4. 
WAGNER_MACRO_PROOF 11/21/12 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  11:58 AM 
2012 TORT, SOCIAL SECURITY, AND NO-FAULT SCHEMES 37 
to every citizen. The intellectual framework for this approach was set out in 
the Beveridge Report of 1942, which explicitly intended to overcome 
“sectional interests” and to provide equal protection for every member of 
society.103 In the years to follow, many of the proposals of the Beveridge 
Commission were implemented, even though lawmakers did not always 
follow their recommendations in detail, e.g., preferring flat contributions as 
well as pre-fixed and flat benefits.104 The thrust of the Beveridge Report 
was incompatible with the English version of workers’ compensation that 
had been put in place in 1897, but had never eliminated the private action 
against the employer. Consequently, the Beveridge Commission had 
questioned the program’s preferential treatment of workers, but the 
commission ultimately recommended its continuation.105 Parliament 
followed this advice: it refused to altogether abandon workers’ 
compensation and instead opted for its reform in the guise of the National 
Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act of 1946. 
To the present day, workers enjoy access to the industrial injuries 
disablement benefit, which entitles victims of workplace injuries and 
occupational diseases to pension or lump-sum payments.106 Eligibility 
under the scheme does not depend on employer fault, and benefits remain 
available even to those employees who contributed to the injury through 
their own negligence.107 The amount of the industrial injuries disablement 
benefit is regulated by statute and depends on the degree of disablement.108 
Disputes are resolved by tribunals that operate outside of the civil justice 
system and are said to be faster and more efficient than courts of law. 
B. The Failure of Social Security 
In both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the move away from 
workers’ compensation and towards revivification of employers’ liability 
was backed up by a rather generous social security mechanism, which was 
designed to be the same for everyone, workers and nonworkers. In both 
 
 103.  SIR WILLIAM BEVERIDGE, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALLIED SERVICES ¶¶ 7–9 (1942) (U.K.); 
see Engelhard, supra note 101, at 36–38.  
 104.  BEVERIDGE REPORT, supra note 103, ¶ 80 (referencing a “flat rate of compensation for 
disability”); see id. ¶ 304 (referencing a flat rate of insurance benefits, except with regard to losses 
caused by industrial accident or disease).  
 105.  Id. ¶ 80 (“If a workman loses his leg in an accident his needs are the same whether the 
accident occurred in a factory or in the street.”). For a recent discussion [of the worker’s compensation 
program,] see Stephen Jones, Social Security and Industrial Injury in SOCIAL SECURITY LAW IN 
CONTEXT 461 (Neville Harris ed., 2000). 
 106.  WIKELEY & OGUS, supra note 98, at 759.  
 107.  Id. at 741.  
 108.  Id. at 753-59. 
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countries, however, the high level of benefits initially available through 
social security proved unsustainable in the long run. 
In the United Kingdom, the industrial injuries compensation scheme, 
as originally conceived, looked much like the lost-earnings-prong of 
workers’ compensation systems that it intended to replace. While this 
characterization was fairly accurate in 1946, it has become quite erroneous 
today. Over time, the industrial injuries scheme was integrated into the 
general social security system. Today, it is exclusively funded out of 
general tax revenues, not through the contributions of employers.109 At the 
same time, the level of benefits has gradually decreased. In 1982, the so-
called injury benefit, which had compensated victims for short-term losses 
of income caused by temporary disablement, was abolished in favor of a 
combination of sick pay and benefits available under general social security 
programs.110 Finally, pensions for lost earnings under the industrial injuries 
benefit scheme were abolished altogether in 1990.111 While the scheme 
continues to pay pensions, their amounts depend exclusively on the degree 
of disablement rather than the victim’s income prior to the accident.112 The 
maximum pension, paid out for 100% disability, amounts to no more than 
£150 per week, less than $240.113 As a consequence, the so-called 
disablement benefit is no longer a means to compensate lost wages at all, 
but a means to compensate nonpecuniary loss, i.e. the loss of amenities 
resulting from permanent or temporal, partial or full disablement.114 Today, 
victims must rely on the protection under general social security to cover 
their living expenses or resort to tort actions to restore their earnings in full. 
In the Netherlands, the failure of social security is even more striking. 
The generous social security scheme, which compensated losses due to 
disability, was created in 1967, at the peak of the post-war economic and 
demographic boom. Not surprisingly, it turned out that the level of 
compensation was not sustainable over the years, as economic and 
demographic growth slowed and moral hazard increased. In a world 
involving much economic uncertainty, a program that offered generous 
benefits, often approaching full income replacement, attracted a large 
number of applicants and, consequently, recipients. As early as the 1970s, 
 
 109.  Id. at 719.  
 110.  Richard Lewis, The Abolition of Injury Benefit, 34 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 44, 44-45 (1983); 
WIKELEY & OGUS, supra note 98, at 716.  
 111.  WIKELEY & OGUS, supra note 98, at 716.  
 112.  Jones, supra note 105, at 481-83.  
 113.  Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit (Accidents), DIRECT.GOV.UK, 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/MoneyTaxAndBenefits/BenefitsTaxCreditsAndOtherSupport/Disabledpeo
ple/DG_10018839 (last visited Sept. 17, 2012). 
 114.  WIKELEY & OGUS, supra note 98, at 716.  
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the Dutch system was widely perceived to be “out of control”115 and 
“unmanageable.”116 If the government had allowed this system to continue, 
17% of the population would have received benefits on account of 
“disability” by 2040.117 
The major cause that, had it been left uncontrolled, would have ruined 
the system was ex post, not ex ante, moral hazard.118 In the Netherlands, it 
seems that the disabilities act, as originally designed in 1967, was abused 
by employees, often in collusion with their employers, in order to smooth 
the transition from an industrial economy to a service economy and the 
transition of Dutch families from the traditional single-earner to the dual 
career model.119  These may be honorable goals, but they have nothing to 
do with disability and cannot be supported on the basis of a system that 
allows for nearly-complete income replacement. 
In order to keep the scheme alive, the Dutch lawmakers had to 
intervene time and again, beginning in the 1980s.120 Step by step, the level 
of assistance available under the disability-to-work scheme was lowered, 
the requirements regulating access to the system were tightened, and a 
schedule for repeated re-examinations during the currency of benefits was 
imposed. Together, these measures helped remove the Netherlands from 
the top position of the OECD’s list of countries with the highest ratio of 
disabled people within the general population.121 
Today, the same distortions that haunted the Dutch system of 
disability insurance affect its American counterpart, which has run into 
serious financial trouble in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The 
federal social security disability insurance program provides rather modest 
benefits to those unable to work. Due to a rather drastic relaxation of the 
insurance trigger towards a largely subjective multi-factor test in 1984 and 
the relative increase in the value of disability insurance benefits relative to 
wages over time, the program was thought to be unsustainable even before 
 
 115.  Richard V. Burkhauser, Mary C. Caly & Philip R. de Jong, Curing the Dutch Disease: 
Lessons for United States Disability Policy 29 (Univ. of Mich. Ret. Research Ctr., Research Paper No. 
2008-188, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1337652; see also Jan-Maarten van 
Sonsbeek & Raymond Gradus, Estimating the Effects of Recent Disability Reforms in the Netherlands 4 
(Tinbergen Inst. Discussion Papers, Working Paper No. 11-121/3, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1655706. 
 116.  Van Sonsbeek & Gradus, supra note 115, at 3.  
 117.  Id. at 2 (internal citation omitted). 
 118.  See supra, Part IV.C.2. 
 119.  Van Sonsbeek & Gradus, supra note 115, at 4–5 (internal citations omitted).  
 120.  For a description of Dutch legislative intervention, see id. at 4–6; Engelhard, supra note 101, 
at 57.  
 121.  Van Sonsbeek & Gradus, supra note 115, at 4 (citing OECD, TRANSFORMING DISABILITY 
INTO ABILITY: POLICIES TO PROMOTE WORK AND INCOME SECURITY FOR DISABLED PEOPLE (2003)).  
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the economic crisis following the financial meltdown of 2008 hit.122 
Subsequent to the economic downturn, the payouts of the program have 
soared, pushing it towards the brink of bankruptcy.123 Over the last ten 
years, the number of recipients has risen by around 64.07 percent with high 
concentrations in those areas where the depression has hit hardest and 
where unemployment rates are highest. 
The upshot of the experience described is that general systems of 
disability insurance are extremely vulnerable to ex post moral hazard, 
particularly, but by no means exclusively, in times of economic crisis. For 
this reason, the idea upon which the Dutch lawmakers of 1967 acted, i.e., to 
combine rather generous benefits familiar from workers’ compensation 
systems with broad coverage against any disability, regardless of its cause, 
proved to be unworkable. Social insurance systems are always vulnerable 
to ex post moral hazard and cannot function without the incentives 
generated by a significant gap between the level of wages and the level of 
benefits. If people are no worse off within the social insurance system 
when compared to active participation in the work force, the system is 
abused for purposes of early retirement and concealing unemployment. 
C. Tort as an Indispensible Fall-Back Mechanism 
With regard to the consequences of workplace accidents and 
occupational diseases, the demise of social insurance programs has led to 
increased reliance on tort. Originally, private claims for compensation were 
thought to function as an add-on, particularly in addressing nonpecuniary 
losses. In reality, tort has developed into a full-scale remedy invoked to 
meet rather basic financial needs. Not surprisingly, the doctrines limiting 
access to recovery in tort, i.e., the fault principles and its corollaries, were 
placed under pressure. In this way, disability insurance and employers’ 
liability work together like pistons: the less water the former holds, the 
higher the water-mark is in the latter. 
Again, Dutch law provides the best illustration: in conjunction with 
the scaling down of disability insurance benefits, lawmakers and courts 
increased the bite of employers’ liability. Under Articles 7:658(1) and 
6:170 of the Dutch Civil Code (Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek – NBW), the 
employer is liable not only for the consequences of his own negligence, but 
 
 122.  David Autor & Mark Duggan, The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal 
Crisis Unfolding 9-15, 20 (MIT Dept. of Econ. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-23, 
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=921123.  
 123.  Disability Payments: The Elephant in the Waiting-Room, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 12, 2011), at 
36–37; Damian Paletta, Insolvency Looms as States Drain U.S. Disability Fund, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 22, 
2011) at A1, A16.  
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also for negligence of the other employees. Thus, the conduct of co-
workers is attributed to the employer even if the injury did not affect a third 
party but another employee of the same employer.124 In doing so, Dutch 
law avoids the consequences of the former common law “fellow-servant 
rule” or the “common-employment” principle, pursuant to which the 
employer was not liable for the fault of other employees.125 In addition, the 
defense of assumption of risk has been eliminated altogether, and the 
employer may defend himself with regard to contributory fault only where 
he can establish intention or recklessness on the part of the employee 
(Article 7:658(2) NBW).126 As if this were not enough, the Supreme Court 
of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) applies the fault principle strictly; in other 
words, the standard of care imposed on the employer is high.127 At the other 
end of the employment relationship, the behavior of the employee is 
measured against a rather lenient standard so that claims for compensation 
are rarely reduced on account of comparative negligence of the plaintiff.128 
Rather, the employee must have acted with intent or “deliberate 
recklessness,” i.e., she must have been aware of the recklessness of her 
behavior when committing the act. The Hoge Raad even went so far as to 
invent a duty to take out market insurance for the benefit of employees. 
Under this line of jurisprudence, the employer must supply his employees 
with first-party insurance coverage for personal injuries suffered in traffic 
accidents.129 Failure to comply with this duty exposes the employer to 
liability for the consequences of injuries he could not have prevented at 
reasonable cost but could have insured the worker against. This effectively 
amounts to a duty of care equivalent to a strict liability regime. The court 
created an outcome close to what would have been achieved under 
workers’ compensation, albeit through the backdoor. 
In the United Kingdom, the action against the employers had always 
been kept alive, as the old workmens’ compensation acts did not grant the 
employer any immunity under the common law. On the other hand, since 
the workers’ compensation system picked up most of the costs of 
workplace accidents and occupational diseases, the principles of 
employers’ liability remained in their restrictive state as defined by the 
trinity of defenses.130 In particular, the defense of “common employment” 
 
 124.  LINDENBERGH, supra note 30, ¶ 28.  
 125.  See supra Part III.C., at note 35.  
 126.  LINDENBERGH, supra note 30, ¶ 30.  
 127.  Id. ¶ 21–23.  
 128.  Id. ¶ 31.  
 129.  Id. ¶ 41.  
 130.  See supra Part III.C, at note 35.  
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remained available to the employer and allowed him to reject vicarious 
liability for the acts of a fellow worker who had caused the accident 
negligently or even intentionally.131 The defense was only formally 
abolished in 1948, with the reform of the social security system inspired by 
the Beveridge Report.132 Even prior to that date it was already dead, as the 
courts had managed to navigate around the rule through the development of 
a nondelegable duty of care to organize, equip, and staff the workplace 
with a reasonable degree of safety.133 Today, vicarious liability of the 
employer for tortious acts of fellow servants, liability for breach of 
statutory duty, and the general duty of care to provide “a competent staff of 
men, adequate material, and a proper system and effective supervision”134 
work together to facilitate the recovery of victims against their employers. 
The employer cannot defend himself by pleading “assumption of risk” 
based on the fact that the employee failed to quit a dangerous job.135 
Nowadays, the defense of contributory negligence does not suffice to 
defeat the victim’s claim entirely, but only leads to a reduction in quantum. 
In the overwhelming majority of cases, courts seem to allow workers to 
recover most of their damages.136 
D. Asbestos-Related Diseases as a Touchstone of Liability Systems 
The systems of employers’ liability based on tort law that were in 
place in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom faced their first serious 
challenge when confronted with the problem of asbestos-related diseases 
such as asbestosis, mesothelioma, and lung cancer. The first cases 
involving diseases caused by asbestos entered the English court system in 
the late 1990s.  Given the modest level of benefits available under the 
industrial injuries scheme,137 employees suffering from such serious 
diseases had no choice but to resort to tort claims and to try to enforce them 
 
 131.  E.g., Priestley v. Fowler, (1837) 150 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1032-33; 3 M. & W. 1, 5–7. 
 132.  Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c.41 (Eng.).  
 133.  Wilsons & Clyde Coal Ltd. v. English, [1938] A.C. 57 (H.L.) 78–81; W. V. HORTON 
RODGERS, WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ ON TORT, ¶¶ 8-2 to 8-3, 8-10 to 8-14 (17th ed. 2006) (describing the 
recorded history of employer’s liability and the nature of the employer’s duty).  
 134.  Wilsons &  Clyde Coal Ltd., A.C. 57 at 78 (internal quotations omitted).  
 135.  Harris v. Brights Asphalt Contractors, [1953] 1 Q.B. 617, 628–629; RODGERS, supra note 
133, ¶ 8-16 (“The general defence of voluntary assumption of risk is rarely available in cases of 
employers’ liability because the courts are unwilling to infer an agreement by the worker to trun the risk 
of his employer’s negligence merely because he remains in unsafe employment.”) (internal citations 
omitted).   
 136.  RODGERS, supra note 133, ¶ 6-52 (“It has often been stated that safety legislation exists to 
protect workers from consequences of their own carelessness, and the courts will therefore be slow to 
hold a worker guilty of contributory negligence.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 137.    See supra, Part V.B., note 110. 
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in the civil courts. In doing so, the main obstacle to recovery turned out not 
to be proving that the employer breached its duty, but rather proving 
causation, given that most workers had been exposed to asbestos while 
working for several different employers over the course of their lifetime. In 
the typical case, only one of the various employers had survived and was in 
command of assets, including insurance funds, sufficient to cover claims 
for damages. The (former) House of Lords initially committed to holding 
each employer liable for the full loss under the theory of joint and several 
liability,138 but it later retreated and embraced the principle of proportional 
liability, holding each employer liable only for a fraction of the total harm 
that reflects his share of the risk relative to the total amount of risk.139 
Subsequently, the English parliament intervened and restored, through 
legislation, the original rule of joint and several liability.140 The latest 
decision of the UK Supreme Court allowed the claim for compensation 
even in a case where the exposure of the victim at the workplace increased 
the background risk of contracting the disease of mesothelioma by no more 
than 18 percent.141 Some suggest that this far-reaching decision was 
influenced by the fact that workers suffering from mesothelioma were 
otherwise left to rely on the rather basic benefits available under social 
security programs. 
In the European countries that run workers’ compensation systems, 
disease caused by asbestos dust has never been an issue in the civil courts. 
Rather, these cases have been taken care of by workers’ compensation 
carriers. By aggregating cases, such systems present several advantages 
over tort litigation in addressing the problems of multi-factor scenarios. 
First, workers’ compensation systems avoid problems related to 
establishing employer causation. Second, relatedly, they avoid problems 
with allocating tort responsibility among insurers. Third, unlike liability 
insurance against tort actions, workers’ compensation systems compensate 
victims at current rates. 
Under a system of workers’ compensation, it is not necessary for a 
worker who suffers from mesothelioma to identify the employer on whose 
premises he inhaled the toxic fiber. Where, as in Germany, workers’ 
compensation carriers are responsible for whole industries, changes of 
 
 138.  Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd., [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 A.C. 32 (H.L.).  
 139.  Barker v. Corus UK Plc., [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572 (H.L.).  
 140.  Compensation Act 2006, c. 29 §3 (U.K.); Alison McAdams, Barker and the King of Persia, 
156 NEW L. J. 1433 (2006); Rebecca Herbert, The Compensation Act 2006, 4 J. PERS. INJ. L. 337, 341–
42 (2006).  
 141.  Sienkiewicz v. Greif (U.K.) Ltd. and Knowsley Metro. Borough Council v. Willmore, [2011] 
UKSC [118]. 
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employment over the course of a work life do not matter much as long as 
one may be reasonably certain that the disease was contracted at one of the 
several workplaces. In addition, workers’ compensation systems avoid the 
intricate problems of identifying the relevant insurance contract that is 
liable to answer in any given case. Within systems of employers’ liability, 
insurance coverage depends on the trigger defined in the insurance contract 
at issue, be it “injuries caused,” “injuries occurring,” or “claims made.” 
Different triggers specify different applicable contracts—the contract at the 
time of exposure, at the time of manifestation of the illness, or at the time 
of filing the insurance claim. In essence, the problems are identical to the 
ones that haunted environmental liability insurance in the 1980s and 
1990s.142  With regard to liability for asbestos-related diseases, these same 
issues are currently litigated heavily in England.143 Moreover, courts must 
allocate responsibility among insurers when employers and third parties, 
such as building contractors, are jointly and severally liable, when the 
liability of several employers is at issue, or even when the victim spent his 
whole working life with a single employer. In the last case, the employer 
may have had multiple contracts with multiple insurers, so courts must 
identify the answerable insurance contract to determine the amount of 
coverage and to allocate damages payments to particular insurance periods 
and insurers. In contrast, under a well-run workers’ compensation system, 
there is no need to force the start of the disease into a time-frame—the 
system compensates injured workers regardless of when and in whose 
employment the injury occurred. 
Finally, in many cases, it may turn out that the insurance contract that 
must answer is decades old, so that the sums available as cover are utterly 
inadequate. In contrast, workers’ compensation systems present no danger 
of inadequate coverage, as workers are compensated for the harm at current 
levels of damages payments. In France, victims of asbestos-related diseases 
are even entitled to additional benefits, which are added to the pensions 
awarded under workers’ compensation.144 
 
 142.  See  Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 4th 645, 655 (1995).  
 143.  Bolton Metro. Borough Council v. Municipal Mutual Ins. Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 50 
(Eng.); BAI (Run Off) Ltd. v. Durham, [2012] UKSC 14. For the time being, the English courts have 
rejected the so-called “triple trigger theory” adopted by American courts, according to which exposure 
to asbestos dust, development of an adverse medical condition, and diagnosis of the manifest disease 
are all equally sufficient to make insurers answerable on their contracts.  Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. 
Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1042-1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981).    
 144.  Loi. 2000-1257 du 23 décembre 2000 de financement de la sécurité social pour 2001 [Law 
2000-1257 of Dec. 23, 2000 on the Financing of Social Security for 2001], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 24, 2000, p. 20558, 20568–76, 
available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr. 
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E. Conclusion 
The abandonment of workers’ compensation in the Netherlands and 
the UK is anything but a success story. The promise offered by once 
generous social security systems turned out to be unsustainable, mainly 
because of rampant ex post moral hazard. As a consequence of the shortfall 
of social security, the private action against the employer regained much of 
its central role. Not surprisingly, the old disadvantages of the tort system 
turn up again, i.e. an unfavorable ratio between benefits and administrative 
costs as well as serious difficulties in channeling compensation to victims 
in cases involving long-tail risks and multiple tortfeasors. It seems that both 
jurisdictions would have been better advised to stick to the somewhat old-
fashioned and boring system of workers’ compensation instead of relying 
on a combination of social security and tort. 
V. CIRCUMVENTIONS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEMS 
A. Dissipating the Savings in Administrative Costs 
The previous part has shown that doing away with workers’ 
compensation altogether involves serious disadvantages. However, on a 
smaller scale, the same problems also surface in jurisdictions that held on 
to the traditional model of workers’ compensation. In many countries that 
continue to operate such systems there is an increasing tendency to 
circumvent workers’ compensation and instead rely on tort for the 
compensation of losses caused by industrial injuries. The common root of 
the challenges posed by such attempts seems to be the obvious divergence 
between the benefits available in workers’ compensation and in tort. As 
explained above, workers’ compensation systems avoid the calculation of 
damages in each individual case and instead award pensions on the basis of 
an abstract assessment of losses in terms of the degree of disablement. 
While it is not clear that this move undercompensates victims 
systematically, it does undercompensate those workers who sustained the 
most serious injuries and are thus completely disabled, losing their earning 
capacity altogether. The wedge between workers’ compensation benefits 
and tort damages is further increased by the unavailability of pain and 
suffering damages as well as punitive damages in workers’ compensation. 
The shortfall of workers’ compensation benefits compared to full tort 
damages has triggered a number of troubling developments that tend to 
undermine the principles of workers’ compensation and, more importantly, 
dissipate the advantages the system was set up for in the first place. The 
two main inroads into these principles are: 
 Victims seeking to upgrade workers’ compensation benefits to 
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full tort damages—i.e., full income replacement plus 
compensation for nonpecuniary harm—by suing the employer 
for aggravated fault. 
 The prosecution of third parties who are not subject to the 
immunity rule that protects the employer from private suits. 
While the first point is internal (in the sense that it could be resolved 
within the framework of workers’ compensation), actions against third 
parties raise important and difficult issues that relate to the positioning of 
workers’ compensation within the overall architecture of accident law writ 
large. Consequently, the challenge posed by third party actions can only be 
resolved within the general context of the liability system. However, both 
options raise serious concerns as they threaten to dissipate the main 
advantage that justifies workers’ compensation in the first place, i.e. the 
significant savings in administrative costs in comparison to a combination 
of employers’ liability and liability insurance. 
B. Suits against Employers 
1. Inroads into the Immunity Principle 
In all jurisdictions that operate workers’ compensation schemes, the 
immunity rule steps aside where the employer intentionally caused the 
harm.145 In such cases, the employee may sue her employer in civil court, 
either in contract or in tort, to recover full damages. While these principles 
are followed everywhere, the scope of the exception varies greatly. A 
narrow reading of intention would require the employer to have acted with 
an intention to cause bodily harm to the employee, while for a more lenient 
view, it would be sufficient if the employer intended to commit the act or 
omission that was the cause of the injury. Under the lenient definition, it is 
sufficient for a finding of intention that the employer knowingly breached 
safety regulations that were imposed on him. The majority of jurisdictions 
subscribed to the narrow view and refused to relax the immunity that 
shielded employers as long as the harm was caused accidentally, even if the 
conduct of the employer amounted to gross, wanton, willful, deliberate, 
intentional, reckless, culpable, malicious or other kinds of aggravated 
negligence.146 
In many jurisdictions courts have gone far beyond the core meaning of 
the concept of intentional harm and have included accidental injuries. In 
French law, the move away from a narrow exception to the immunity 
 
 145.  See, e.g., KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 234 (describing Germany’s worker 
compensation scheme); see ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.23, at 85-86, § 6.36, at 174.  
 146.  LARSON’S  WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, supra note 80, § 103.03, at 103-7.  
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principle was initiated by the legislature. While the French social security 
act incorporates the common rule that the employer may be sued in civil 
court where he caused the harm intentionally,147 it goes beyond it by 
carving out another exception for cases of inexcusable negligence (faute 
inexcusable). Where inexcusable negligence has been established, the 
victim receives her ordinary pension plus an additional sum as 
compensation from the competent workers’ compensation carrier.148 
Alternatively, she may sue the employer directly before the same 
administrative tribunal that is competent to hear the claim in workers’ 
compensation. Provided that this tribunal finds that the behavior of the 
employer amounted to inexcusable negligence, the workers’ compensation 
institution may recoup any payments made to the victim from the employer 
so that the latter bears the full loss.149 
In addition, France made the interesting choice to award victims of 
asbestos-related illness the privilege of full tort damages independent of a 
showing of intention or inexcusable negligence by entrusting the 
compensation of these victims to a special branch of the social security 
system.150 The so-called FIVA (Fonds d’Indemnisation des Victims de 
l’Amiante) serves the double function of, on one hand, supplementing the 
workers’ compensation system by providing additional benefits in the form 
of higher pensions and a lump-sum payment for nonpecuniary harm, and, 
on the other hand, providing compensation to “secondary victims” like the 
spouses of workers who were exposed to asbestos dust through their 
interaction with the primary victim. As a practical matter, the availability of 
additional funds for compensating victims of asbestos helped to deter 
litigation in the civil courts where victims had begun to claim for full 
damages based on the theory that employers were guilty of gross 
negligence (faute inexcusable) and thus could not avail themselves of 
workers’ compensation’s immunity rule. 
In the United States, the broadening of the concept of intention as it 
was traditionally understood within the context of employers’ liability151 
was orchestrated not by lawmakers but by the courts which developed the 
so-called “substantially certain” test that equates foresight with intention. 
Where the plaintiff succeeded in establishing facts that suggested that the 
employer had been “substantially certain” to cause harm, the immunity rule 
 
 147.  LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, para. 384.   
 148.  LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, para. 385-86.   
 149.  FRANCE, Code de la sécurité sociale, Art. L 452-2, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.   
 150.  See Loi. 2000-1257 du 23 décembre 2000. 
 151.  See supra, note 142 and accompanying text. 
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stepped aside.152 In many American jurisdictions, the concept is not limited 
to cases where the employer intended to do harm but rather extends to 
situations where the employer willfully or recklessly failed to comply with 
safety rules or instructions or removed safety devices that would have 
protected the worker from injury.153 While the former cases are rare, the 
latter may be plentiful, given the elasticity of such concepts as recklessness. 
As a consequence of the relaxation or supplementation of the 
intentional-harm exception, litigation for additional benefits has increased 
considerably. In France, it seems that an allegation of inexcusable fault is 
now almost routinely added to a claim for workers’ compensation 
benefits.154 The French courts have facilitated this development by 
interpreting the concept of fault inexcusable in an objective, strict-liability-
like way: under the theory of a strict duty to provide a safe work 
environment (obligation de sécurité de résultat), the employer is liable if it 
can be established that rules of safety had not been followed. 
With regard to American law, it was proposed to go even further and 
allow the injured worker to sue the employer in tort whenever the 
hypothetical tort claim exceeded the benefits received under workers’ 
compensation by at least $10,000.155 While the implementation of this 
solution would increase the amount of litigation quite dramatically, it 
would simplify the resolution of these disputes, as there would be no need 
to plead and prove elusive concepts like “inexcusable negligence.” 
2. The Substantive Issues: Full Income Replacement and Damages for 
Nonpecuniary Losses? 
a) The Seriousness of the Harm 
The drive towards private causes of action is fueled by the shortfall of 
workers’ compensation benefits as compared to the amount of damages 
available in tort. An alignment of workers’ compensation benefits and tort 
damages would remove the incentive to turn to the civil courts and to 
enforce claims against an employer guilty of intention or aggravated 
 
 152.  The development of the case law is described by William J. Maakestad & Charles Helm, 
Promoting Workplace Safety and Health in the Post-Regulating Era: A Primer on Non-Osha Legal 
Incentives that Influence Employer Decisions to Control Occupational Hazards, 17 N. KY L. REV. 9 
(1989), at 32-37; LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, supra note 80, § 103.04 (“erosion of the 
requirement of actual intent”).   
 153.  LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, supra note 80, § 103.04, at 103-23, 103-36-103-39.  
 154.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters]  soc., Feb. 28, 2002, D. 
[Recueil Dalloz] 2002, 2696 (Fr.); LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, para. 386-86.  
 155.  Theodore F. Haas, On Reintegrating Workers’ Compensation and Employers’ Liability, 21 
GA. L. REV. 843,  894 (1987).  
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negligence. The question of whether workers’ compensation benefits 
should be upgraded to approximate or equal tort damages raises two 
separate points, namely income replacement and damages for nonpecuniary 
losses. As it happens, the two are closely linked to each other. 
Workers’ compensation systems do not award damages for 
nonpecuniary losses, such as pain and suffering, disfigurement, and loss of 
amenities. This is not to say that the damages available under workers’ 
compensation systems never include such a component. In cases of 
comparatively minor bodily injuries that still impede or destroy some 
bodily functions, the victim will be awarded a pension for the resulting loss 
of her ability to work. While the degree of disability will be small and the 
pension modest, over time it will accumulate to a sizable damages award. 
However, in many cases of minor injuries, the victim’s income is not 
diminished, presumably because many victims adapt quickly to the 
disability and manage to make up for it in daily life. Even when no 
pecuniary loss is suffered, the pension will be awarded and continue to run 
during the work life of the victim. In such cases, the victim is being 
overcompensated for her pecuniary losses; thus, the pension assumes the 
function of compensating nonpecuniary losses. It allows the injured party 
to engage in some costly activities that otherwise would not have been 
affordable. 
The matter is different for serious injuries and diseases that leave the 
victim fully disabled. For this class of victims, which remains excluded 
from the workforce, the pension will often fall short of the actual loss in the 
form of lost earnings, particularly where these pre-injury earnings had been 
above average.156 To the extent that the full pension is needed and used for 
the purpose of income replacement, as it often must in cases involving 
serious injuries or diseases, it does not contribute anything towards the 
compensation of nonpecuniary harm. With regard to serious injuries, the 
black-letter proposition that workers’ compensation does not offer benefits 
for pain and suffering is still valid. 
Arguably, it amounts to a failure of workers’ compensation systems 
that over-compensates the lightly injured and under-compensates those 
who have been seriously disabled. In Germany, the exclusion of damages 
for nonpecuniary losses from the benefits offered by workers’ 
compensation schemes has been challenged on constitutional grounds 
twice.157 The petitioners pointed to the inconsistency of a legal regime that 
 
 156.  See supra, Part II.D.  
 157.  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Nov. 7, 1972, 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 34, 118, 129-135;  BVerfG, Feb. 
8, 1995, NEUE JURISTISCHE   WOCHENSCHRIFT (NJW) 1995, 1607 f.; KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, 
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leaves victims empty-handed by denying compensation for nonpecuniary 
losses while simultaneously extending the immunity rule to shield the 
employer from liability for such losses. The Federal Constitutional Court 
disagreed. In the eyes of the justices, workers’ compensation systems are 
based on an implicit bargain in which the worker eschews full 
compensation of any loss sustained in exchange for no-fault liability of a 
public insurance carrier which both provides rather generous support in 
cases of minor injuries, only adequate compensation in cases of major 
injuries, and eliminates the risk of insolvency. 
b) Including Damages for Non-Pecuniary Losses 
While this is all true, the question remains whether it is sound policy 
to exclude nonpecuniary losses from the scope of compensation altogether 
and whether it makes sense to overcompensate those who sustained only 
minor injuries. As a matter of policy—rather than constitutionality—these 
choices seem hard to defend. First of all, empirical studies suggest that 
workers would be prepared to pay the price, in the form of reduced wages, 
for more comprehensive coverage.158 This finding contradicts the 
assumption, made in the general economic theory of compensation 
systems, i.e., that it is not in the interest of workers to insure against 
nonpecuniary losses, provided that they have to pay for it, as they must 
here in the form of wage reductions.159 The major shortfall of the current 
system seems to be that there is no inverse relation between the gravity of 
the injury and the demand for pain and suffering damages. Quite the 
opposite: victims who have the strongest interest in damages for pain and 
suffering are those who have sustained the most serious injuries. But it is 
precisely this class of victims who suffer most from the current system. It 
seems absurd that the current system denies compensation of this part of 
the total losses to those who need it most and awards it to others who need 
it less. If any discrimination between victims were appropriate, then the 
rule would have to be the other way around, i.e., to award damages for 
nonpecuniary loss to the severely injured and deny it to those who have 
suffered only minor injuries. 
c) Restraining Moral Hazard 
An important consideration counseling against an increase in workers’ 
 
at 236-37.  
 158.  MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 51 (“Taken at face value, these results imply that 
existing levels of workers’ compensation benefits are suboptimal from the standpoint of insuring 
income levels.”).  
 159.  SHAVELL, supra note 39, at 228-30.  
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compensation benefits is moral hazard.160 It has been explained above that 
the unusual combination of strict liability and the absence of a contributory 
negligence defense, which is the hallmark of a workers’ compensation 
system, is sustainable partly because benefits fall short of full 
compensation.161 Because workers are not made indifferent between the 
state of injury plus a compensation package, and the state without the 
injury and without the compensation package, their incentives to take care 
and avoid injuries remain largely intact. The expansion of benefits to 
approximate full compensation seems to remove the essential safeguard 
against moral hazard, i.e., the undercompensation of victim-employees. 
Indeed, empirical studies have shown that increases in benefit levels 
generate moral hazard in the form of an increased number of claims and a 
longer duration of disablement.162 
However, this conclusion does not necessarily counsel against 
increasing benefits for serious injuries because moral hazard would remain 
manageable.  With regard to ex ante moral hazard, workers will still prefer 
the state of the world without the serious injury—e.g., loss of leg, loss of 
eyesight—to a state with the injury even if the compensation package were 
increased significantly.163 This is most pronounced in the case of fatal 
injuries: increasing the benefits available to the family of dead workers 
does not lead to a decrease in precautions against death.164 In addition and 
even more importantly, the risk of ex post moral hazard—i.e., the 
fabrication of injuries—seems to be manageable, too. Since serious injuries 
are much more difficult to imitate, the risk of abuse and fraud is only 
minor. Again, fatal accidents provide the best example. 
d) Economizing Administrative Costs 
Second, the exclusion of damages for pain and suffering generates 
strategies to circumvent the immunity rule and to sue the employer for 
aggravated fault or to go against third parties. Within the current system, 
workers who suffer injuries receive less compensation than the victims of 
other accidents, such as traffic victims. As a consequence, workers injured 
on the job will try to circumvent the workers’ compensation system and to 
top-up their damages by suing either the employer, alleging intentional 
wrongdoing or inexcusable negligence (depending on the scope of the 
exception from the immunity rule), or third parties who may be liable in 
 
 160.  See Epstein, supra note 35, at 801, 809.  
 161.  See supra, Part IV.A.3.  
 162.  MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 53-68.  
 163.  See supra, Part. IV.A.3. 
 164. MOORE & VISCUSI, supra note 43, at 29.  
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tort.165 To the extent that this happens, another layer of administrative costs 
is added to the bill that employers have to pay. 
e) Conclusion 
In light of these considerations lawmakers would be well advised to 
redistribute the payouts under workers’ compensation away from the 
lightly injured in favor of the seriously injured. As to the latter, pensions 
should be increased up to the point of full equivalence of after-tax income, 
and damages for pain and suffering should be added to the bill. As it is 
close to impossible to imitate serious injuries or diseases, the risk of abuse 
posed by such a move should be negligible and the consequences of such a 
reform therefore predictable and manageable. 
3. The Administrative Issue: Upgrading Workers’ Compensation 
Benefits vs. Private Suits against Employers 
The next question concerns the choice of a procedural mechanism 
suitable to claims for full compensation. One way to improve the current 
situation would be to abandon the immunity principle altogether and to 
allow ordinary tort suits against the employer in all cases. Such a move 
would obviously raise the fundamental question of the justification for the 
continued existence of workers’ compensation systems. Why run special 
compensations schemes if the victims may resort to the general law 
anyway? To the extent that victims used workers’ compensation as an 
institution of first resort and the tort action as an opportunity for additional 
damages, such duplicative mechanisms would be very costly to operate. 
The reinstatement of the private action against the employer would have to 
coincide with the scrapping of workers’ compensation institutions.  The 
experience of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands suggests that such a 
move would not be wise. 
An alternative to the present state of affairs, where exceptions to the 
immunity rule increase in number and scope, is offered by the French 
solution of integrating claims for full compensation based on inexcusable 
fault into the system of workers’ compensation. In cases of inexcusable 
fault, the victim may either sue the employer or collect additional damages 
from the competent workers’ compensation carrier.166 In the latter case, the 
courts of general jurisdiction are not involved at all. One important 
advantage of this solution is that claims are settled in one step and within a 
single type of proceeding, either (exclusively) a lawsuit or (exclusively) a 
workers’ compensation claim. This solution avoids the duplicative 
 
 165.  See infra, Part VI.C. 
 166.  LAMBERT-FAIVRE & PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, para. 384-86.  
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litigation of identical issues before both civil courts and workers’ 
compensation boards, thus sparing scarce judicial and administrative 
resources. 
The proposal to provide for additional compensation for serious 
injuries and diseases within the scheme of workers’ compensation mirrors 
the French approach to inexcusable fault that allows for the 
supplementation of the compensation awarded to the victim within the 
institutions and processes of the workers’ compensation system. However, 
unlike in France, the upgrade available for serious injuries and diseases 
must be made mandatory, excluding the option to sue the employer for 
damages in civil court. In addition, the upgrade available in workers’ 
compensation should not be limited to cases involving aggravated fault.167 
In limiting the additional compensation to cases of aggravated fault, French 
law introduces a requirement that is foreign to the other areas of the 
workers’ compensation system and whose elements are difficult to prove. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that litigation around the concept of faute 
inexcusable is intense and administrative costs are significant. In addition, 
the requirement of aggravated fault does not remedy the inconsistency 
inherent in current systems of workers’ compensation, i.e., to 
overcompensate minor injuries and to undercompensate the severely 
injured. There is no correlation between the degree of fault and the severity 
of the injury or disease. If the current situation is to be improved, additional 
benefits must be channeled into the pockets of those victims who suffered 
the most serious harms and not be distributed evenly across the class of 
victims who were affected by an employer’s grossly negligent behavior. 
Changes in the law that would allow the seriously injured to recover 
damages for nonpecuniary harm, and a pension achieving full income 
replacement, would adequately correspond to the shortcomings of current 
workers’ compensation systems while at the same time avoiding the 
additional litigation and associated costs the current system generates. 
Within a system that allows the seriously injured to recover additional 
benefits, there is no incentive for separate actions launched against the 
employer individually, and even less so for separate civil actions that 
would be particularly costly. Rather, it would suffice if the victim applied 
for additional benefits and the workers’ compensation carrier or the 
competent dispute resolution board found that the injury was serious 
enough to warrant additional compensation. 
 
 167.  See supra Part VI.B.1.  
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C. Claims against third parties 
1. U.S. Exceptionalism 
Another strategy aimed at making victims whole within the current, 
undercompesatory system targets not the employer, but third parties. Even 
though the immunity granted by workers’ compensation schemes in all 
jurisdictions is limited to employers, suits against third parties are 
pervasive only in the United States. In the United States, manufacturers of 
machinery, plant equipment, and raw materials have been sued on a large 
scale by employee-plaintiffs seeking to recover full damages for workplace 
accidents and diseases.168 In fact, the pursuit of claims against third parties 
in cases involving occupational hazards has become routine in the United 
States, even though these claims should be the primary responsibility of 
workers’ compensation carriers. 
The most prominent examples are the various illnesses caused by the 
inhalation of asbestos dust at the workplace. The descent of the major 
American producers of asbestos products into bankruptcy from an 
avalanche of tort claims is well-documented, and the evolution of 
American tort law that helped to bring about this outcome has been 
discussed repeatedly.169 From a comparative perspective, one striking 
feature of this story is the total absence of workers’ compensation from the 
picture.170 It was easy to foresee that asbestos-related diseases would create 
problems in jurisdictions that had abandoned workers’ compensation, like 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, but in the United States, one 
would have expected that asbestos would be dealt with primarily, if not 
exclusively, under workers’ compensation schemes. But, in fact, rather than 
bankrupting workers’ compensation carriers, the flood of claims for 
damages associated with asbestos bankrupted the manufacturers of 
asbestos-made products. The obvious question is how could this happen? 
2. Explanations 
The explanation for the large-scale responsibility of third-parties for 
 
 168.  See Paul C. Weiler, Workers’ compensation and Product Liability: The Interaction of a Tort 
and a Non-Tort Regime, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 825 (1989);  see also  Richard A. Epstein, The Legal and 
Insurance Dynamics of Mass Tort Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 475, 485-88 (1984); William A. 
Dreier, Injuries to Production Workers: Reform of the Workers’ Compensation Product Liability 
Interface, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 813 (1995-1996).  
 169.  The leading bankruptcy case is In re Johns-Manville Corp. 68 B.R. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), 
decision aff’d in part, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), order aff’d, Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 
F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988). For a comprehensive study by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice cf. 
STEPHEN C. CARROLL, DEBORAH HENSLER, JENNIFER GROSS, ELIZABETH M. SLOSS, MATTHIAS 
SCHONLAU, ALLAN ABRAHAMSE & J. SCOTT ASHWOOD, ASBESTOS LITIGATION 107-123 (2005).  
 170.  For an early critique of this situation see Epstein, supra note 162, at 486. 
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the harm caused by asbestos products covers two areas, namely the 
interface between workers’ compensation and tort on the one hand, and 
products liability on the other. To begin with the first area, the relationship 
between workers’ compensation and the general law of torts is organized 
by two principles:171 
 No immunity for third parties. While the employer is 
protected from private suits for damages based on workplace 
accidents and occupational diseases, third parties are not so 
protected.  They remain fully exposed to employees’ damages 
claims. 
 Right of recourse against third parties for employers and 
workers’ compensation carriers. To the extent that third 
parties are being held liable for the consequences of work-
related risks, their responsibility takes priority over the 
responsibility of the employer, or the workers’ compensation 
carrier that insulates the employer from liability. One 
consequence of the priority of third-party liability is that a 
court awarding damages  to the victim in a successful tort 
action against a third party has to set off prior benefits 
received from workers’ compensation institutions. In the face 
of this prospect, the incentive of the victim to seek benefits 
from workers’ compensation carriers is rather weak in the 
presence of a strong third-party claim, as there is nothing to 
gain but an advance on the recovery available in tort.172 
Secondly, and depending on the way in which workers’ 
compensation systems are set up, either the employer or the 
workers’ compensation carrier succeeds to the damages claim 
of the victim against the third party by way of subrogation or 
assignment. With regard to claims with a relatively low 
probability of success, damages suits against third parties for 
personal injuries are often not even initiated by victims and 
their lawyers, but by employers and their insurers who bring 
or finance tort actions for their own benefit.173 An empirical 
study has found that no less than one quarter of product 
liability actions involving occupational hazards were brought 
not by victims, but by employers or workers’ compensation 
carriers, enforcing their subrogation rights.174 
 
 171.   LENCSIS, supra note 9, at 42-43.  
 172.  See Epstein, supra note 168, at 486.  
 173.  See Weiler, supra note 168, at 836.  
 174.  W. Kip Viscusi, The Interaction between Product Liability and Workers’ Compensation as Ex 
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The combination of these doctrines caused a considerable portion of 
the costs of workplace injuries and diseases to be shifted away from 
employers and workers’ compensation carriers and onto manufacturers of 
equipment and raw materials. As early as the mid-1970s, the total payouts 
to employees under tort for permanent disablement were more than twice 
the amount of the benefits received under workers’ compensation.175 This 
result is surprising in light of the fact that the two principles—no immunity 
against tort claims protecting third parties, and rights of recourse of 
employers or workers’ compensation carriers against third parties who are 
liable in tort for the same harm—are not exclusive to American law but a 
common feature of workers’ compensation systems.176 Thus, the 
prevalence of third-party suits in the U.S. remains a puzzle. 
The key to understanding the developments in the U.S. is not in the 
interface between workers’ compensation and tort; rather, it lies in the 
distinctive features of American tort law, or rather, of its special branch of 
products liability. The concept of product defect was applied to tools, 
machinery, equipment, and raw materials as if equipment and materials had 
been distributed to employees, without accounting for the involvement of 
employers. Under current doctrines of products liability law, equipment 
manufacturers must make sure that their products are safe even if the harm 
was caused by the negligent or even reckless behavior of the employer.177 
In the leading case for this doctrine, the operator of a high-lift loader was 
injured after he had jumped off the vehicle in apprehension of its tipping 
over. The manufacturer of the loader was held liable even though the 
victim had never received adequate training to operate the device and had 
been assigned to the task by his employer on the day of the accident only 
because the regular operator had not reported for work.178 What is most 
remarkable about this decision is not its result but that the court did not 
even care to discuss the involvement of the employer. Instead, it analyzed 
the case as if the loader had been distributed directly to consumers—a 
proposition clearly in conflict with the facts.179  Manufacturers of 
equipment and raw materials are held liable for the consequences of 
workplace accidents and diseases not only if the employer entrusted the 
 
Post Remedies for Workplace Injuries, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 185, 192 (1989).   
 175.  Weiler, supra note 168, at 829.  
 176.  As to Germany KÖTZ & WAGNER, supra note 8, at 306-307; as to France LAMBERT-FAIVRE 
& PORCHY-SIMON, supra note 8, para. 388. 
 177.  The leading case is, Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); within the 
context of asbestos the leading case is, Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 
552-553 (Cal. 1991); cf. also Weiler, supra note 168, at 836-837.  
 178.  Barker, 573 P.2d at 447. 
 179.  See id. at 454.  
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equipment to unskilled, untrained, or otherwise unable employees, but also 
if he failed to take simple precautions, ignored safety instructions, or 
removed safety devices installed by the manufacturer. A study undertaken 
in the 1970s—before the onslaught of mass tort litigation involving 
asbestos-related diseases—found that one quarter of all product liability 
cases filed by employees against third parties involved some negligence on 
the part of their employers.180 
3. A Critique of Third-Party Liability for Industrial Injuries 
The legal problem that lies at the root of the current situation is not the 
immunity of third parties in general. The failure to grant third parties the 
same immunity as the employer is common to all workers’ compensation 
systems. This is for good reason, since it is essential to preserve the 
incentives of third parties to take care. 
a) Deterrence 
The real issue is not the liability of third parties in general, but the 
duties of care imposed on manufacturers of equipment and raw materials in 
particular. Obviously, the safety measures taken by equipment 
manufacturers interact with the precautions taken by the employer. To a 
large degree, the precautions of employers and those of equipment 
manufacturers are substitutes of one-another. In such a situation, it is 
essential to adjust the standard of care and the attribution of liability in a 
way that the total costs of precautions taken to reach the efficient level of 
harm are being minimized. This cannot be done if the focus is on one party 
only, i.e., the equipment manufacturer, and the outcome will be even worse 
where the focus is on the wrong party, i.e., on the party that is not in 
control of the decisions proximate to the accident or cause of disease. 
Employers are not only buyers of equipment and raw materials but 
professional parties with duties of their own to control the use and 
operation of such equipment and to manage the associated risks. It is the 
employer who controls the workplace and is thus in the best position to 
manage occupational risk. The employer decides which safety equipment 
to install and how to use it, how to educate and train employees, how long 
to expose employees to hazardous conditions, which employees to assign to 
a certain task, etc. To the extent that a large portion of the costs of 
workplace accidents and occupational diseases is shifted away from 
employers and onto equipment manufacturers, the incentives of employers 
to take precautions and to invest in workplace safety are seriously 
undermined. In effect, the party that is closest to the risk and could most 
 
 180.  Weiler, supra note 168, at 837.  
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effectively control the level of workplace safety—the party who is the 
“cheapest cost avoider”—is insulated from liability.181 The adverse effects 
of such a rule are particularly pronounced where the employer entrusts 
dangerous machinery to employees who are unskilled in its proper use. In 
this case, a liability rule targeting the manufacturer generates incentives to 
make equipment fool-proof, i.e., so safe that it can even be operated by 
unskilled people without causing any harm. The same level of safety could 
be achieved at lower cost if the employer contributed his share of 
precautions. These arguments also apply to asbestos-related diseases as the 
employer decides on the duration and conditions of exposure, e.g., whether 
to install ventilation or provide protective clothing.182 To place the full 
burden upon manufacturers of asbestos products is not the most efficient 
way to achieve a desired level of safety. 
The choice of precautions and the distribution of the costs of liability 
between employers and their suppliers of equipment and raw materials 
should be left to the contractual arrangements of these parties and not be 
superimposed by an overbroad system of products liability. Under the 
current system, the parties to the sales contract of work equipment lack the 
power to allocate the responsibilities for safety measures and the resulting 
liabilities between them. This situation cannot be remedied within workers’ 
compensation law but must be addressed in the law of products liability. 
With the exception of cases of flagrant product defects, the responsibility 
for the safety of work equipment must be focused on the employer, not the 
manufacturer. 
b) Administrative Costs 
The second concern raised by adding third party liability relates to 
administrative costs. While workers’ compensation systems are much 
cheaper to run than the tort system, they still consume resources in their 
administration.183  These resources are well invested if workers’ 
compensation institutions manage to settle the dispute. In the United States, 
however, this is not the case. Workers’ compensation provides only the 
first layer of compensation, if the employee claims anything from these 
carriers at all. In many cases, a second suit is brought in tort so that another 
layer of dispute, litigation and, in case of success, compensation is added. 
Given that the administrative costs of the tort system are already high on 
 
 181.  SHAVELL, supra note 100, at 189-90 (discussing the notion of least-cost avoider in bilateral 
relationships). The present case is different as it presents a trilateral relationship involving the victim-
employee, her employer, and the manufacturer of equipment or raw materials. 
 182.   See supra, Part V.D. 
 183.  Weiler, supra note 168, at 839. 
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their own, the total sum of administrative costs will be truly exceptional if 
the costs of two systems are added together. In granting full tort damages 
on top of benefits available in workers’ compensation, American law puts a 
double burden of administrative costs on society. To put this point in 
perspective, consider the following estimates of costs spent dealing with 
asbestos-related diseases. In the U.S., these costs as of 2005 were estimated 
to run up to $72 billion, of which $40 billion or roughly 57 percent were 
spent on litigation costs. These costs are likely to increase in the future, as 
illustrated by the (failed) proposal of the Fairness in Asbestos Injury 
Resolution Act of 2005, which contemplated setting up a trust fund in the 
amount of an additional $140 billion.184  In contrast, the German workers’ 
compensation carriers are expected to spend roughly $10 billion on benefits 
and health care for asbestos related diseases.185 Given that the 
administrative costs of this system are 10 percent and that the population of 
Germany is a little more than one quarter of the U.S.’ , these numbers 
translate into a hypothetical bill of $44 billion. This includes administrative 
costs of $4 billion, as compared to U.S. litigation costs of $40 billion. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
General social security schemes awarding substantial benefits for 
disability regardless of cause do not work since they are vulnerable to ex 
post moral hazard, i.e., abuse and fraud. The taxpayer, the government, and 
the agencies of the social security administration are unable to successfully 
control abuse. The experience of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, 
both of which abandoned workers’ compensation for a combination of 
general social security benefits and employers’ liability, is not encouraging 
enough to recommend such a move. Therefore, the replacement across the 
board of liability in tort by general no-fault compensation schemes is not 
desirable. This is true even if the adverse effects of such schemes on 
incentives to take care and adjust activity levels are ignored. If the adverse 
effects of ex ante moral hazard in the form of reduced care and ex post 
moral hazard in the form of phony claims are added together, the case 
against no-fault is even more compelling. 
Focused no-fault schemes like workers’ compensation do work if they 
are managed well. Overall, it seems that the traditional systems of workers’ 
compensation have done much better in coping with the retreat of the 
welfare state and with the onslaught of long-tail risks in the form of 
 
 184.  Lester Brickman, An Analysis of the Financial Impact of S. 852: The Fairness in Asbestos 
Injury Resolution Act of 2005, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 991 (2005-2006).  
 185.  Joachim Breuer, Asbest – eine globale Herausforderung, 2005 BUNDESARBEITSBLATT 20.  
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illnesses involving long latency periods, such as asbestosis and 
mesothelioma. The crucial element that defined the relative success of 
workers’ compensation is that there is a party, or a group of parties, who 
have to come up for the bill and therefore have an incentive to control 
costs, an incentive the taxpaying public does not have or cannot articulate 
effectively. These parties must be put in charge of the claims resolution 
process, not in the sense that they are able to control outcomes but in the 
sense that they determine how the trade-off between administrative costs 
and accuracy in sifting out invalid claims is being made. 
Once a focused no-fault scheme has been established, courts and 
legislators must ensure that the system is not doubled up by the liability 
system. Otherwise, the promise of workers’ compensation, namely 
substantial savings in administrative costs, is wasted. Workers’ 
compensation systems are currently in danger of being pushed aside by 
ever more expansive exceptions from the immunity principle in cases of 
aggravated fault. Lawmakers could deflate incentives to circumvent the 
immunity principle and to sue employers for full damages in tort by 
increasing the benefits available to victims of serious injuries and diseases. 
This group of victims does not receive full compensation under the current 
regime and thus has a strong incentive to resort to tort remedies rather than 
to workers’ compensation in search of full income replacement, as well as 
damages for nonpecuniary losses. The additional benefits should be made 
available within workers’ compensation rather than adding tort as another 
costly compensation system on top of workers’ compensation schemes. 
The risk of ex post moral hazard in the form of exaggerating or imitating 
injuries, while considerable in the area of minor injuries, seems 
manageable with regard to serious injuries and, particularly, cases 
involving death. 
The development in the United States is particularly troublesome for 
the additional reason that workers’ compensation has been overtaken by 
third party liability for defective products in many important areas, such as 
the harm caused by asbestos-related diseases. Legal systems that run 
workers’ compensation schemes and liability systems in tandem and with 
regard to the same type of injury save nothing in terms of administrative 
costs but rather impose a double burden on society. In addition, the shifting 
of the costs of work-related accidents and diseases onto manufacturers of 
equipment and raw materials distorts incentives to take care. Employers 
rather than equipment manufacturers are the cheapest cost avoiders with 
regard to occupational hazards and thus must be made to internalize the 
costs associated with workplace accidents and occupational diseases. As a 
consequence, products liability law needs to retreat from industrial injuries. 
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The responsibility for the safety of the workplace vis-à-vis workers must be 
focused on the employer, and the liability of equipment manufacturers 
should be left to the contract made between them and employers. 
 
